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TWITTER AND THE #SO-CALLEDJUDGE
Elizabeth Thornburg*
ABSTRACT
Two-hundred-eighty characters may be insufficient to deliver a treatise
on the judiciary, but it is more than enough to deliver criticism of the third
branch of government. Today, these tweeted critiques sometimes come not
from the general public but from the President himself. Attacks such as
these come at a challenging time for court systems. We live in a highly
politicized, polarized society. This polarization is reflected in attitudes to-
ward the courts, particularly the federal courts. Unfortunately, public
doubts about the court system come at a time when public understanding
of the structure of government, and especially the court system, is abys-
mally low.
All of this context raises a number of related questions. When the prolific
executive tweeter calls out a federal judge, is President Trump just venting
or has he tapped into a strong subset of American opinion on the judici-
ary? And, if so, does a “so-called judge” have a role in engaging, inform-
ing, perhaps even rebutting these opinions? Further, could 280 characters
be an effective platform to use in fulfilling that role?
This article will address the specific issue of judges using Twitter to pro-
mote the interests of the courts as institutions. After section II’s brief
description of the mechanics of Twitter, section III will discuss why and
how judges communicate through Twitter.
Section IV will sound a note of caution based on two factors: 1) a web of
judicial ethics rules that limit judicial speech (including Twitter); and 2) the
nature of the Twitter experience and the way people use it, which can hin-
der attempts to effectively reach the desired audience.
The article will conclude by arguing that in this day and age, when much
of America gets its news from social media and those platforms are being
used to delegitimize the judiciary, the third branch can ill afford to disen-
gage. Judicial tweeting, within the limits of the ethics rules, should be en-
couraged rather than shunned.
* Richard R. Lee Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. Thanks to Denise
Neary, Senior Judicial Education Attorney at the Federal Judicial Center, for getting me
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I. INTRODUCTION
ONE hundred forty characters may be insufficient to deliver atreatise on the judiciary, but it is more than enough to delivercriticism of the third branch of government.1 Today, these
tweeted critiques sometimes come not from the general public but from
the President himself. Consider these Twitter posts (tweets) by Donald
Trump from February of 2017. He wrote them in response to Federal Dis-
trict Judge James Robart’s2 decision to temporarily enjoin President
Trump’s first travel ban on immigrants from certain Muslim-majority
countries.3
1. Twitter is a microblogging platform, and brevity is its essence. Until November 7,
2017, tweets could be no more than 140 characters long, but on that date, Twitter doubled
the limit to 280 characters. The Twitter activity that is the subject of this article was done
under the original limit (and many Twitter users swear they will stay faithful to 140), and so
retrospective portions of the article retain the reference to 140 characters. Karissa Bell,
Twitter’s 280-Character Tweets Are Here to Stay, MASHABLE (Nov. 7, 2017), http://mash
able.com/2017/11/07/twitter-280-character-limit-expansion/#lpQFbA0hsgqs [https://per
ma.cc/72UU-LCTK].
2. Ted Robbins, Who Is Judge James L. Robart and Why Did He Block Trump’s
Immigration Order?, NPR (Feb. 4, 2017, 3:08 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/04/
513446463/who-is-judge-james-l-robart-and-why-did-he-block-trumps-immigration-order
[https://perma.cc/6D3S-SK7E].
3. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 7:12 AM & 2:44 PM)
(Feb. 5, 2017, 2:39 PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/827867311054974976
[https://perma.cc/63DA-TFYM]. For a collection of the President’s tweets about the court,
see In His Own Words: The President’s Attacks on the Courts, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE
(June 5, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/his-own-words-presidents-attacks-
courts [https://perma.cc/67GV-LPU6].
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Attacks such as these come at a challenging time for court systems. We
live in a highly politicized, polarized society.4 This polarization is re-
flected in attitudes toward the courts, particularly the federal courts. For
example, a 2015 Gallup Poll found that Americans’ trust in the federal
judicial system had fallen to a historical low, with only 53% of responders
saying that “they have ‘a great deal’ or ‘a fair amount’ of trust in it.”5
4. Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 12,
2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public
[https://perma.cc/3REA-NTWT].
5. Jeffrey M. Jones, Trust in U.S. Judicial Branch Sinks to New Low of 53%, GALLUP
(Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/185528/trust-judicial-branch-sinks-new-
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Digging deeper, the pollsters attributed the decline to Republicans un-
happy with the Supreme Court’s controversial decisions that year sup-
porting same-sex marriage and upholding the Affordable Care Act.6 The
judiciary’s authority depends on its perceived legitimacy, and it is dis-
turbing that public opinion divides along partisan political lines. Equally
disturbing is the apparent tendency to elide agreement with decisions and
trust in the institution that made them.
Support for state courts overall seems to have been less affected by
political polarization. A 2016 survey of registered voters conducted for
the National Center for State Courts found that 74% had confidence in
their state court system.7 In response to more specific questions, 71%
agreed that the “courts in their state [were] committed to protecting indi-
vidual and civil rights,” 65% agreed that courts “serve as an appropriate
check on the other branches of government,” 71% agreed that the courts
“treat[ed] people with dignity and respect,” and 63% agreed that the
courts “take[ ] the needs of people into account.”8
Concerns about discrimination nevertheless lurk beneath the positive
numbers. The survey looked at one issue that was “brought into focus” by
the 2016 presidential campaign: opinions about “whether a judge’s
ethnicity influences fairness in the court system.”9 The findings:
In the abstract, we see that most voters do believe there is an influ-
ence, albeit a minor one. But when we move to more specific hypo-
thetical examples, we see a clear . . . racial disparity, with non-white
voters in particular suggesting that a minority defendant is less likely
to receive equal justice from a white judge but few concerns in the
opposite scenario for a white defendant with a minority judge.10
In a similar vein, a 2015 survey of young people reflected worries about
the impact of race on the criminal justice system. A poll of 18- to 29-year-
olds found that 49% of responders had “little to no confidence that the
justice system [could] operate without bias.”11 In addition to the predict-
able racial divide in responses, there was a political one. Almost two-
thirds of those self-identifying as Republicans were confident about the
system’s fairness, while self-identified Democrats were evenly split.12
Again, trust in the court system shows the effects of partisan fault lines.
low.aspx [Perma link unavailable]. Note that trust in the executive branch (45%) and legis-
lative branch (32%) were even lower.
6. Id.






11. Cara Tabachnick, Poll: Young Americans Have “Little Confidence” in Justice Sys-
tem, CBS NEWS (Apr. 30, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/poll-young-peo
ple-have-little-confidence-in-justice-system [https://perma.cc/SY5D-7XYY]. Questions
about the “justice system,” which can be interpreted to ask about the police as well as the
courts, tend to reflect a greater concern about racial disparity.
12. Id.
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Unfortunately, public doubts about the court system come at a time
when public understanding of the structure of government, and especially
the court system, is abysmally low. A September 2016 study by the An-
nenberg Public Policy Center found that “[o]nly a quarter of Americans
[could] name all three branches of government.”13 Knowledge about the
Supreme Court and the Constitution is especially spotty.14 This is not
new. A 1998 survey done on behalf of the American Bar Association had
similar results. Further, public understanding of the function of courts
was weak. “While about half knew the judicial branch interprets laws, just
as many thought its function was to enforce laws.”15
All of this context raises a number of related questions. When the pro-
lific executive tweeter calls out a federal judge, is President Trump just
venting or has he tapped into a strong subset of American opinion on the
judiciary? And, if so, does a “so-called judge” have a role in engaging,
informing, and perhaps even rebutting these opinions? Further, could 280
characters be an effective platform to use in fulfilling that role?
This article will address the specific issue of judges using Twitter to
promote the interests of the courts as institutions.16 After Section II’s
brief description of the mechanics of Twitter, Section III will discuss why
and how judges communicate through Twitter. Section IV will sound a
note of caution based on two factors: (1) a web of judicial ethics rules that
limit judicial speech (including Twitter); and (2) the nature of the Twitter
experience and the way people use it, which can hinder attempts to effec-
tively reach the desired audience. The article will conclude by arguing
that in this day and age, when much of America gets its news from social
media and those platforms are being used to delegitimize the judiciary,
the third branch can ill afford to disengage. Judicial tweeting, within the
limits of the ethics rules, should be encouraged rather than shunned.
13. Americans’ Knowledge of the Branches of Government Is Declining, ANNENBERG
PUB. POL’Y CTR. (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/americans-
knowledge-of-the-branches-of-government-is-declining [https://perma.cc/B56C-SU8U].
Thirty-one percent could not name any branch at all.
14. Matthew Shaw, Civil Illiteracy in America, HARV. POL. REV. (May 25, 2017, 6:12
PM), http://harvardpolitics.com/culture/civic-illiteracy-in-america [https://perma.cc/L5KU-
9ETZ].
15. AM. BAR ASS’N, PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 10 (1998), https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/abanews/
1269460858_20_1_1_7_upload_file.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7KY-S8GH].
16. The use by judges of social media in general and Twitter in particular raises addi-
tional issues that are beyond the scope of this article. For example, ethical rules requiring
judges to act with “dignity” have been invoked as a limit on social media posts. Judicial
Discipline & Disability Comm’n v. Maggio, 440 S.W.3d 333, 334 (Ark. 2014); Mass. Comm.
on Judicial Ethics, Op. 2016-09 (2016), http://www.mass.gov/courts/case-legal-res/ethics-
opinions/judicial-ethics-opinions/cje-2016-09.html [https://perma.cc/VX4E-6W6T]; Cal.
Judges Ass’n Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 66 (2010) (“While it may be acceptable for a
college student to post photographs of himself or herself engaged in a drunken revelry, it is
not appropriate for a judge to do so.”). And, as is true for all of us, the decision to maintain
an online presence raises issues of security. See generally PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARING-
HOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org [https://perma.cc/P7TA-YG54].
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II. TWITTER 101
Twitter is a social network that permits a user to create and share infor-
mation. Twitter was launched in 2006, and by 2014 it already had 646
million registered users.17 At the end of the first quarter of 2017, Twitter
estimated that it had 328 million active users.18 As of the writing of this
article, more than 6,000 postings, called “tweets,”19 are processed every
second; 500 million tweets are posted per day; and around 200 billion are
posted per year.20 A tweet may contain no more than 280 (formerly 140)
characters but can link to other information on the internet, including
articles, images, and videos. About 40% of Twitter users do not post their
own tweets, but do observe others’ tweets and use Twitter as a curator of
news and information.21
Twitter users create a “handle” to identify themselves. The handle be-
gins with an @ sign followed by letters and numbers chosen by the user.
For example, my Twitter handle is @btSMU; Donald Trump’s Twitter
handle is @realDonaldTrump.22 Entities can also have Twitter accounts,
which also have handles. Thus the journal in which this article is pub-
lished is @SMULawReview, the Supreme Court of Texas is
@SupremeCourt_TX, and Starbucks Coffee is @Starbucks.
Because Twitter is meant to be a shared experience, there are a number
of ways to interact with others. Users can communicate directly but pub-
licly with each other by including handles in tweets; they can communi-
cate privately by sending a “direct message” (DM for short). A user may
repost another user’s tweet (retweeting), which can be done with or with-
out adding a new comment by the retweeter. A Twitter user may also
“like” other people’s tweets by clicking on a heart-shaped icon. In addi-
tion, Twitter users may publicly “reply” to other people’s tweets. In all of
these cases, the targeted Twitter user will be informed of the interactions.
Twitter users are also encouraged to “follow” other Twitter users, and on
the user’s homepage there is a “news feed” that displays the tweets of the
followed users.23 Each homepage also displays, for anyone to see, lists of
17. 2014 CCPIO NEW MEDIA SURVEY, CONFERENCE OF COURT PUB. INFO. OFFICERS
6 (Aug. 6, 2014), http://ccpio.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/CCPIO-New-Media-survey-
report_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SRE-VYNJ] [hereinafter CCPIO].
18. Daniel Sparks, How Many Users Does Twitter Have?, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Apr.
27, 2017, 11:06 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/04/27/how-many-users-does-twit
ter-have.aspx [Permalink unavailable].
19. The screenshots from President Trump’s accounts shown above are examples of
what tweets look like.
20. Twitter Usage Statistics, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/
twitter-statistics [https://perma.cc/8HDJ-GCUH].
21. CCPIO, supra note 17, at 6.
22. This is the account he had before becoming President, which he still uses prolifi-
cally. There is also an official Twitter account for the President of the United States, which
was transferred from President Obama to President Trump. Its handle is @POTUS. (Just to
make matters a tad more confusing, the @POTUS account sometimes retweets the
@realDonaldTrump account’s tweets.)
23. The feed actually uses a complex algorithm designed to deliver the content the
Twitter user most wants to see. This algorithm is discussed at greater length in Section
IV.B, infra.
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who that Twitter user follows and who follows him or her. Users may
“block” or “mute” undesired followers.24
Although it is possible to make a Twitter account “private,” most Twit-
ter users hope that their posts will be widely read. One way to attract
notice from people who do not follow the user is by the use of hashtags.
Adding a # sign before a word (or words smashed together) helps people
who are searching for comments on that topic to find the tweet.25 For
example, some lawyers who specialize in appellate practice include the
hashtag #AppellateTwitter to help attract like-minded Twitter users.26
References to the U.S. Supreme Court often include the hashtag
#SCOTUS. Another popular legal hashtag is #A2J (Access to Justice).
Some hashtags are quite political, for example: #Resist for Trump oppo-
nents and #MAGA (short for “Make America Great Again”) for Trump
supporters. Since the February 2017 tweets criticizing the judge in the
travel ban case, #SoCalledJudge has been used often by Twitter users of
all political persuasions.
For those who do not use Twitter and might be helped by a visual im-
age, below is a what a Twitter user sees when looking at another user’s
homepage.
24. Blocking Accounts on Twitter, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://support.twitter.com/ar
ticles/117063 [https://perma.cc/P8PA-UGA3]. Note, however, that a government account’s
blocking of another Twitter account based on the content of its tweets may raise constitu-
tional concerns. See Daniel Funke, Knight Institute Sues President Trump over Twitter
Blocking, POYNTER (July 11, 2017), http://www.poynter.org/2017/knight-institute-sues-presi
dent-trump-over-twitter-blocking/466322 [https://perma.cc/BDY3-GYH9]. For a general
discussion of constitutional issues raised by government social media forums, see Ross
Rinehart, Note, “Friending” and “Following” the Government: How the Public Forum and
Government Speech Doctrines Discourage the Government’s Social Media Presence, 22 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 781, 782 (2013).
25. What Are Hashtags and How to Use Them, DIG. MKTG. PRO, https://www.di
gitalmarketingpro.net/what-are-hashtags-and-how-to-use-them-312 [https://perma.cc/
VRK5-HVC8].
26. Christina DiPinto, The Marketing Appeal of #AppellateTwitter, MUSE COMM.,
http://www.musecommunicationsllc.com/marketing-appellatetwitter [https://perma.cc/
R9BS-UA8M].
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III. WHY AND HOW JUDGES TWEET
In a general sense, judges use Twitter for the same reason everyone
else does: to share news and information (personal, professional, political,
commercial) and to be part of online communities discussing that infor-
mation. Information gathering is a big part of typical Twitter usage. An
American Press Institute survey in 2015 found that “81% [of Twitter
users] keep up with the news at least daily” (71% use it several times a
day).27 But they are not merely consumers of information. Thirty one
percent say they use Twitter “to tell others what I am doing and thinking
about,” 24% “to ‘keep in touch with people I know,’” 19% “[t]o share
news” and “[t]o network,” and 18% “[t]o follow trending topics.”28 Be-
yond news, there are lots of ways to use Twitter, depending on one’s
interests.29
If a court or a judge wants to reach out to the public, social media
makes sense. “[T]he judiciary is finally joining the public it serves where
the public has chosen to congregate.”30 Accordingly, courts and judges
are using social media far more than in the past. One national survey
found that social media use by the judiciary increased from 40% in 2010
27. Tom Rosenstiel et al., How People Use Twitter in General, AM. PRESS INST. (Sept.
1, 2015, 10:30 AM), http://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/survey-re
search/how-people-use-twitter-in-general/ [https://perma.cc/83C5-RHUJ].
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Daniel Nations, Why Twitter? Ways for Beginners to Get Started,
LIFEWIRE (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.lifewire.com/ways-for-beginners-to-use-twitter-
3486595 [https://perma.cc/C4XK-GHEW] (suggesting microblogging, quick answers, find-
ing a job, keeping up with the news, arranging lunch with friends, venting, keeping up with
a favorite team, finding out what people really think about the latest movie, and becoming
involved with politics).
30. John G. Browning, The Judge as Digital Citizen: Pros, Cons, and Ethical Limita-
tions on Judicial Use of New Media, 8 FAULKNER L. REV. 131, 131 (2016).
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to 86% in 2013.31 More than 42% of public information officers agreed in
2014 that using social media is necessary for courts to connect to the pub-
lic.32 As one court information officer noted, because traditional media
covers the judicial branch far less often than they used to,
[t]here is an emerging recognition among courts that in order to ful-
fill the requirement that courts are transparent and understandable
to the public in the new media age we are in, courts will have to play
an active role in facilitating access to information and perform many
of the same functions that traditionally have been performed by the
now dwindling traditional media.33
 A recent Pew study determined that 21% of all adult Americans are on
Twitter, and their demographics are a further indication of the utility of
Twitter for public outreach.34 Thirty-six percent of young adults (ages
18–29) use Twitter, and “29% of internet users with college degrees use
Twitter.”35 Thirty percent of urban internet users use Twitter, while only
21% of suburban and 15% of rural users are on Twitter.36 There does not,
however, seem to be a strong ethnic or racial divide in Twitter use. Pew’s
study found that about 25% of Latino internet users, 27% of black in-
ternet users, and 21% of non-Hispanic white internet users are on Twit-
ter.37 Employing social media platforms allows courts and judges to reach
a different audience than if they used print and television news sources
alone and helps them reach a younger, more educated, and demographi-
cally diverse population.38
Twitter in particular has a lot to offer to courts. “The most popular
social media tool for courts, Twitter use has quickly spread and, in many
instances, become a mainstay for communicating critical, time-sensitive
31. Id. at 131 (citing CCPIO, supra note 17).
32. CCPIO, supra note 17, at 4, 8; see also Michael S. Sommermeyer, All-a-Twitter:




33. Christopher J. Davey, The Future of Online Legal Journalism: The Courts Speak
Only Through Their Opinions?, 8 I/S: A J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 575, 600 (2013).
34. Shannon Greenwood, Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Social Media Update
2016, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/11/social-media-
update-2016/ [https://perma.cc/NQ97-W6YA].
35. Id.
36. Maeve Duggan, The Demographics of Social Media Users, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug.
19, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/19/the-demographics-of-social-media-users.
[https://perma.cc/7QLH-WGPN].
37. Jens Manual Krogstad, Social Media Preferences Vary by Race and Ethnicity, PEW
RES. CTR. (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/02/03/social-media-
preferences-vary-by-race-and-ethnicity/ [https://perma.cc/5SD2-N4QJ] (also reporting that
Hispanic and black internet users are more likely than white internet users to use In-
stagram, while Pinterest is more popular with white users). A slightly later Pew survey put
Hispanic and black Twitter use at 28% and white use at 20%. Duggan, supra note 36.
38. Media Insight Project, How Millennials Get News: Inside the Habits of America’s
First Digital Generation, AM. PRESS INST. (March 16, 2015, 12:01 AM), https://www.ameri-
canpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/survey-research/millennials-news [https://
perma.cc/4MF4-NZW9].
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information to the public and the media.”39 It can also be used for more
interactive outreach. In April of 2017, for example, the Provincial Court
of British Columbia held its second annual Twitter Town Hall, using the
hashtag #AskChiefJudge to allow members of the public to ask ques-
tions.40 Georgia’s courts have done the same using #AskGAJudges.41
The social media context is new, but judicial ethics codes have long
encouraged judges to help educate their communities about the role of
the courts. The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct allows judges to
participate in activities “concern[ed with] the law, the legal system, or the
administration of justice,”42 and the code governing federal judges en-
courages them to “speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in other
activities concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of
justice.”43 The federal commentary explains why:
Complete separation of a judge from extrajudicial activities is neither
possible nor wise; a judge should not become isolated from the soci-
ety in which the judge lives. As a judicial officer and a person spe-
cially learned in the law, a judge is in a unique position to contribute
to the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice, includ-
ing revising substantive and procedural law and improving criminal
and juvenile justice. To the extent that the judge’s time permits and
impartiality is not compromised, the judge is encouraged to do so.44
Not every judge will choose to use Twitter or other social media for this
purpose, but judges’ unique experience and vantage point on the law-in-
action makes them a tremendous resource to the community in under-
standing both the law and the role of courts.45
Many judges got started using Twitter for a very pragmatic reason: they
have to run for election, and social media, including Twitter, is an essen-
tial campaign tool. As Texas Supreme Court Justice Don Willett (@Jus-
ticeWillett) noted:
39. CCPIO, supra note 17, at 11.
40. Have You Got a Question for the Chief Judge?, PROVINCIAL CT. B.C. (Mar. 28,
2017), http://provincialcourt.bc.ca/enews/enews-28-03-2017 [https://perma.cc/AL22-VCN3]
(noting success of the 2016 Twitter Town Hall).
41. #AskGAJudges #LawDay Edition, STORIFY, https://storify.com/ashleystollar/ask-
gajudges-lawday-edition [https://perma.cc/JLA5-NDU8]. An earlier occurrence was an-
nounced by the Judicial Council of Georgia, Administrative Office of the Courts, http://
georgiacourts.gov/content/askgajudges [https://perma.cc/G6MV-U2G2] (announcing Sept.
15, 2016 Twitter Town Hall).
42. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
43. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 4(A)(1) (2014).
44. Id., cmt. on Canon 4. See also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 6
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (recommending that judges “should initiate and participate in com-
munity outreach activities for the purpose of promoting public understanding of and confi-
dence in the administration of justice”).
45. This article does not mean to suggest that other entities, such as bar associations,
law schools, and court public information offices do not also have a role to play. They do.
See, e.g., Protecting Our Judiciary: What Judges Do and Why It Matters, AM. BAR ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/american_judicial_system/projects.html
[https://perma.cc/H6PF-EJXA].
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Judges are elected in 39 states, and Americans increasingly consume
information online. If you’re a Texas Supreme Court Justice hop-
scotching across 254 counties, trying to tattoo your name onto the
noggins of millions of voters, you must find creative ways to raise
visibility and build awareness. Twitter, Facebook, etc. are low-cost
but high-yield ways to leverage the support of key influencers and
opinion leaders. Bottom line: It’s political malpractice not to engage
people smartly via social media.46
Tweeting, then, provides judges with a higher profile, allows outreach to
voters, helps make judges (and thus courts) seem more accessible, and (if
desired) allows judges to announce their positions on legal issues.47 Here
are two examples of election-related communications: a straightforward
campaign tweet and a retweet of a very partisan political tweet, both by a
candidate for an intermediate appellate court in Texas.48
46. Don Willett, The Tweeter Laureate of Texas Discusses Judges’ Use of Social Media,
WASH. TIMES (July 22, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/22/celebrate-
liberty-month-the-tweeter-laureate-of-te/ [https://perma.cc/N36Y-RN6Y].
47. As to the latter, judicial ethics rules create limits that will be discussed in Section
IV.A, infra.
48. Justice David Schenck (@Schenck_Texas), TWITTER (Nov. 7, 2016, 1:49 PM),
https://twitter.com/Schenck_Texas/status/795714901767553024 [https://perma.cc/95BU-
REKH]; retweet of Phillip Huffines (@PhillipHuffines), TWITTER (Nov. 1, 2017, 5:34 PM),
https://twitter.com/PhillipHuffines/status/793582000728739840 [https://perma.cc/88TL-
PL8L].
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Campaign tweets alone garner little attention because they tend to be
pretty boring. Judges therefore engage in additional Twitter activity to
connect them with voters. That additional type of tweeting also engages
the Twitter audience as citizens. Many of the most successful judicial
tweeters49 spend considerable time humanizing themselves. They may
tweet pictures of their children or pets; they may support their alma ma-
ter’s teams; they may comment on the latest episode of Game of Thrones;
or they may put their sense of humor on display. While done largely as a
campaign tool, making judges more accessibly human may also help alle-
viate a sense that courts are too formal, out of touch, or otherwise off-
putting.50
49. As of November, 2017, Texas Supreme Court Justice Don Willett has 105,000 fol-
lowers. In contrast, Justice Schenck of the Dallas Court of Appeals had 171. See Justice
Don Willett (@JusticeWillett), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/JusticeWillett/followers [https:/
/perma.cc/6ZWS-2DL8] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017); Justice David Schenck
(@Schenck_Texas), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/Schenck_Texas/followers [https://
perma.cc/EJF2-J2WK] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). To put this in perspective, Justin Bieber
had almost 103 million followers. See Justin Bieber (@justinbieber), TWITTER, https://twit
ter.com/justinbieber/followers [https://perma.cc/254Q-AEQ9] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
50. For example, the first National Center for State Courts public opinion survey in
1999 found that “one-third of African-American respondents feel ‘Courts are “out-of-
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Some judges use not only their tweets but also their Twitter profiles
(again, where allowed by their jurisdictions) to provide information about
their party affiliation, values, and judicial philosophy. While some (in-
cluding Justice Willett) strive to keep their Twitter presence nonpartisan,
others take a side. These range from the brief and party-oriented (Justice
Ada Brown: “I’m a Republican appellate court judge in Texas”)51 to
more full-bodied self-descriptions such as “I believe in a loving God, the
U.S. Constitution, the rule of law, American exceptionalism, and tradi-
tional Texas values” (Justice Jeff Brown)52 or “Loves God, his wife, his
family, America, Texas, and the Texas A&M Aggies” (Justice Scott
Field).53
Even justices who aim for an apolitical Twitter presence sometimes
can’t resist edgy humor. For example, while Justice Willett is a conserva-
tive Republican, elected in a state in which candidates for judicial office
run with party affiliations, he posted the tweet below during the 2016
Republican presidential primary season.54
touch” with what’s going on in their communities’ compared to 21% of Hispanics and less
than 15% of White/Non-Hispanics.” David B. Rottman & Alan J. Tomkins, Public Trust
and Confidence in the Courts: What Public Opinion Surveys Mean to Judges, CT. REV., Fall
1999, at 24, 26, http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/ctcomm/id/97
[Perma link unavailable]. Cf. HAZEL GENN & ALAN PATERSON, PATHS TO JUSTICE SCOT-
LAND: WHAT PEOPLE IN SCOTLAND DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW 233–34 (2001)
(finding that 70% of respondents “agreed or strongly agreed” that “most judges [are] out
of touch with ordinary peoples’ lives”).
51. Justice Ada Brown (@JusticeAdaBrown), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/JusticeAda
Brown [https://perma.cc/Q8UC-6XB4] (last visited July 30, 2017).
52. Justice Jeff Brown (@judgejeffbrown), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/judgejeff
brown [https://perma.cc/9CEV-7YMF] (last visited July 30, 2017).
53. Judge Scott Field (@ScottKingField), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/ScottKingField
[https://perma.cc/NC2Q-6K9H] (last visited July 30, 2017).
54. Justice Don Willett (@JusticeWillett), TWITTER (Apr. 8, 2016, 10:32 PM), https://
twitter.com/justicewillett/status/718280241752510465 [https://perma.cc/BG9U-YDQT].
This was not Justice Willett’s only Twitter dig at Donald Trump. See Bobby Blanchard, 9
Times Texas Supreme Court Justice Don Willett Dissed Donald Trump on Twitter, DALL.
MORNING NEWS (May 18, 2016), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2016/05/18/9-
times-texas-supreme-court-justice-don-willett-threw-shade-at-donald-trump-on-twitter
[https://perma.cc/V33C-JTV3].
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Humor, moreover, can be a tricky thing. Since this article was first writ-
ten, Justice Willett has been nominated by President Trump to a seat on
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. At his Senate confirmation hearing,
the content of his tweets were fair game.55 While it may be safe to make
fun of New Yorkers who put peas in guacamole, two tweets in particular
that were perhaps intended to be jokes, but which were disrespectful of
55. Emma Platoff, Don Willett Defends Controversial Tweets As Jokes at Confirmation
Hearing Before U.S. Senate, TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/
11/15/don-willett-defends-controversial-tweets-jokes-confirmation-hearing-us/ [https://
perma.cc/FD8G-HNK8].
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LGBTQ citizens, provoked pointed questions.56 Tweeting that reaches
out to voters may be less well received when the audience shifts, and
what judges say on Twitter is as relevant as what they say to live
audiences.
Judges often use Twitter to educate readers about issues pertaining to
the workings of the courts. Note that in the tweets below, both Chief
Judge Dillard57 and Judge Smith58 include links that would take the
reader to longer stories about the subject of the tweet.
56. Justice Don Willett (@JusticeWillett), TWITTER (July 1, 2015 8:42 PM), https://twit
ter.com/justicewillett/status/616421779410694145 [https://perma.cc/5G9X-XCUU]
(“7.1.2015— New York votes for peas in guacamole. 7.2.1776—New York abstains from
voting for US independence” with photo of face captioned “I’VE MADE A HUGE MIS-
TAKE.”); id. (Feb. 14, 2014 5:48 PM), https://twitter.com/JusticeWillett/status/
434474201638920192 [https://perma.cc/777G-TP48] (replying to Fox news story about a
transgender high school girl with “Go away, A-Rod. “@FoxNews: California’s transgender
law allows male high schooler to make girls’ softball team); id (April 29, 2015 8:43 PM),
https://twitter.com/JusticeWillett/status/593591597641531392 [https://perma.cc/23NF-
QM3V] (“I could support recognizing a constitutional right to marry bacon.”).
57. Chief Judge Dillard (@JudgeDillard), TWITTER (June 22, 2017, 3:45 PM), https://
twitter.com/JudgeDillard/status/877990887812243457 [https://perma.cc/N4KK-Y2TS].
58. Judge William Smith (@judgewesmith), TWITTER (Aug. 8, 2016, 8:39 AM), https://
twitter.com/judgewesmith/status/762644326098866176 [https://perma.cc/7WXL-KMDA].
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Courts and judges also use Twitter to keep the public informed about
the ongoing activities of their courts. The release of a noteworthy opinion
is often announced with a tweet. Using the news media as an intermedi-
ary, judges also increase transparency and public outreach by creating
virtual relationships with local news providers by following their Twitter
accounts and allowing the reporters to live-tweet from the courtroom.
U.S. District Judge William Smith of the District of Rhode Island, for
example, follows the Providence Journal, Rhode Island television sta-
tions, and others.59
Other judicial tweets are aimed more specifically at members of the
legal profession. Some tweets highlight continuing education opportuni-
ties and other courthouse events. Judges may use tweets to provide gui-
dance to practitioners. For example, Georgia’s Chief Judge Stephen
Dillard of the Georgia Court of Appeals (@JudgeDillard) hopes that his
Twitter account promotes excellence in appellate practice, encourages
lawyers and law students to practice professionalism and civility, and gen-
erally helps him act as a virtual mentor to students and young lawyers.60
His involvement with the lawyers and law students who use the #Appel-
lateTwitter hashtag61 has included extensive advice about brief writing
and other practice tips.
59. Judge William Smith (@judgewesmith), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/judgewes
mith/following [https://perma.cc/94WE-88FB] (last visited July 10, 2017).
60. Stephen Louis A. Dillard, #Engage: It’s Time for Judges to Tweet, Like, & Share,
101 JUDICATURE 10, 13 (2017).
61. Scott R. Larson, What You Need to Know About #AppellateTwitter, ABA SEC.
LITIG. (May 30, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/litigation-committees/ap
pellate-practice/articles/2017/spring2017-what-you-need-to-know-about-appellatetwitter.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/DD5K-7NL4].
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President Trump’s tweets have incited a new form of judicial tweeting:
responding to the executive branch’s attacks on the judicial branch. The
three tweets noted in the Introduction are not an isolated event. During
the campaign,62 Trump attacked the judge presiding over the Trump Uni-
versity litigation (“I have a judge in the Trump University civil case,
Gonzalo Curiel (San Diego), who is very unfair. An Obama pick. Totally
biased-hates Trump”) and later went on to complain that the Indiana-
born judge was biased because he is “Mexican.”63 As President, he has
gone after judges who have ruled against him and has questioned the
legitimacy of judicial review. In April of 2017, for example, he criticized
the judges who stayed the “sanctuary cities” order.64 In June of 2017, af-
ter courts again ruled against the revised travel ban, frustration with the
courts was again the focus of presidential tweets to his more than 30 mil-
lion followers. (“We need the courts to give us back our rights.” “The
courts are very slow and political!”)65
The Twittersphere is, of course, full of both support for and pushback
against tweets like this. But what about judges?66 May they weigh in?
Using Twitter as a medium has the potential advantage of reaching the
same audience that was exposed to the President’s tweets about the
courts. Tweets can be composed fairly quickly because they are short (re-
member the 140/280-character limit), but they can also link to a longer,
more in-depth discussion that the judge him or herself does not have to
write. Tweets can be posted immediately, without the kind of delay that
would accompany the writing and marketing of an opinion piece in a
traditional newspaper. And, in an ideal world, tweets and their replies
could be a civil and interactive discussion in which people with different
views communicate.
62. Even before the campaign, Donald Trump had a history of accusing judges presid-
ing over his litigation of being biased against him and seeking their recusal. See Michael
Barbaro & Megan Twohey, A Biased Judge? Donald Trump Has Claimed It Before, N.Y.
TIMES (June 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/07/us/politics/donald-trump-judge-
history.html [permalink unavailable].
63. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 30, 2016, 4:45 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/737399475509985280 [https://perma.cc/X3A7-JTGU];
Sean Sullivan & Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls American-Born Judge ‘a Mexican,’ Points out




64. Nina Totenberg, Trump’s Tweets on Court Blocking ‘Sanctuary City’ Order: 5 Facts
to Know, NPR (Apr. 26, 2017, 6:23 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/04/26/525742143/trumps-
tweets-on-court-blocking-sanctuary-city-order-5-facts-to-know [https://perma.cc/W9YD-
KPQY].
65. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 3, 2017, 6:17 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/871143765473406976 [https://perma.cc/2FS2-Z8FR]; Id.
(June 5, 2017, 5:44 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/871679061847879682
[https://perma.cc/256S-9LKV].
66. For a list of self-identified judges with Twitter accounts, see Beth Thornburg (@bt-
SMU), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/btSMU/lists/judges [https://perma.cc/H6S4-ABT3]
(last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
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To explore the possibilities of judicial twitter, as well as its constraints,
consider four example tweets. First, after President Trump posted the
tweets that begin this article, U.S. District Judge William Smith re-
sponded with several tweets, all pointing to the need for respect for the
judicial branch and the rule of law (but none dealing with the merits of
the decision about the travel ban). This one is representative.67
Second, U.S. District Judge Mark Bennett (Northern District of Iowa)
tweeted about his opposition to mandatory minimum sentencing in fed-
eral criminal cases.68
67. Judge William Smith (@judgewesmith), TWITTER (Feb. 6, 2017, 5:30 AM), https://
twitter.com/judgewesmith/status/828566600185954304 [https://perma.cc/A3AQ-XW6C].
68. Judge Mark W. Bennett (@MarkWBennett1), TWITTER (May 25, 2017, 1:39 PM),
https://twitter.com/MarkWBennett1/status/867812376325758980 [https://perma.cc/H6V6-
FN7K]. The NPR interview he refers to is here: A Federal Judge Says Mandatory Minimum
Sentences Often Don’t Fit the Crime, NPR (June 1, 2017, 5:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/
2017/06/01/531004316/a-federal-judge-says-mandatory-minimum-sentences-often-dont-fit-
the-crime [https://perma.cc/4QLU-VQAL]. Judge Smith also tweeted his support for Judge
Bennett’s interview, and he, too, has tweeted his opposition to mandatory minimum
sentences. See Judge William Smith (@judgewesmith), TWITTER (June 5, 2017, 10:10 AM),
https://twitter.com/judgewesmith/status/871745935235313664 [https://perma.cc/ZC6P-
ZDWV]; Id. (June 5, 2017, 10:08 AM), https://twitter.com/judgewesmith/status/
871745599317606400 [https://perma.cc/U7LM-5ZRT] (disagreeing that “naı¨ve” federal
judges need to be “reigned in” by mandatory minimums).
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Third, Justice Willett obliquely highlighted his judicial philosophy.69
Fourth, Judge Dillard tweeted a link to this Wall Street Journal article
about the Supreme Court’s approach to having only eight Justices.70
69. Justice Don Willett (@JusticeWillett), TWITTER (Sept. 9, 2014, 10:00 PM), https://
twitter.com/justicewillett/status/509536749731979264 [https://perma.cc/A7TL-CR7T].
70. Chief Judge Dillard (@JudgeDillard), TWITTER (June 3, 2016, 11:58 AM), https://
twitter.com/JudgeDillard/status/738776858980814849 [https://perma.cc/XH85-T9KB].
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All four tweets deal with the role of judges; all touch on lively issues of
the day. Two are by federal judges and two by state judges. The next
section of this article considers the propriety and efficacy of these and
other tweets about the court system in light of judicial ethics rules and the
nature of Twitter.
IV. GETTING YOUR TWEETS IN A ROW
A. JUDICIAL ETHICS RULES
Courts are a branch of government and, hence, are a part of the politi-
cal system.71 Yet, the traditional view of the judicial branch locates it
above the political fray. One commentator describes this approach:
[F]or reasons of both judicial function and public faith in the courts,
judges are required by virtue of their profession to withdraw from
the turbulent world of majoritarian politics and live their public lives
as a class apart. Two broad themes, one legal and one psychological,
seemingly underlie this view. The legal theme, frequently announced
as a public article of faith by judges and politicians alike, is that the
task of judging involves a faithful and learned adherence to the Law
(with a capital “L”), without reference to the personal views of the
71. For a thorough and fascinating comparative analysis of judicial use of social media
in Australia, see Marilyn Krawitz, Can Australian Judges Keep Their “Friends” Close and
Their Ethical Obligations Closer? An Analysis of the Issues Regarding Australian Judges’
Use of Social Media, 23 J. JUD. ADMIN. 14, 15 (2013).
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judge. Due process, which requires “an impartial and disinterested
tribunal,” implicitly demands this fidelity. The psychological theme,
rarely articulated but fervently believed by many members of the ju-
diciary, is that, if public faith in the courts is to be maintained, the
public must view the judges as a priestly caste.72
This reflexive aversion to being perceived as “political” or as making de-
cisions that reflect their own personal views underlies both general and
specific provisions of codes of judicial conduct.73 The rules constrain the
behavior of judges both in the conduct of their official duties and in their
extrajudicial activities. While there are few rules that specifically address
social media use, the rules governing judicial speech apply to digital me-
dia just as they would to a speech to the local chamber of commerce.
Broadly speaking, there are three types of limits on judicial speech that
would come into play should a judge choose to tweet about the courts: (1)
limits on commenting on pending or impending cases; (2) prohibitions of
ex parte communications; and (3) admonitions to avoid activities that
would reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality, integrity, or indepen-
dence. This section will address each in turn.
1. Comments on Pending and Impending Cases
One way to increase public understanding of the workings of courts
would be to tweet about cases and trials currently pending in the court
system. However, because this creates a strong danger of raising ques-
tions about the judge’s actual or apparent impartiality, the ethics rules
permit only limited public comment, even about cases in other courts.
Rule 2.10(A) of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct provides: “A
judge shall not make any public statement that might reasonably be ex-
pected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending or
impending in any court.”74 Nevertheless, Rule 2.10(D) says judges “may
make public statements in the course of official duties, [and] may explain
court procedures.”75 Rule 2.10(E)76 gives permission to “respond directly
or through a third party to allegations in the media or elsewhere concern-
ing the judge’s conduct in a matter.”77 The federal code’s prohibition is
72. Jon C. Blue, A Well-Tuned Cymbal? Extrajudicial Political Activity, 18 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1, 14–15 (2004) (footnote omitted).
73. Each state has its own code, and there is a separate code for federal judges. Actual
judges should always consult the rules, interpretations, and case law from their own juris-
diction to try to ascertain the limits of acceptable behavior. For the most part, this article
will use the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct (on which most state systems are
based) and the federal Code of Conduct for United States Judges as examples.
74. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
75. Id.
76. Not every state has adopted this provision. See Comparison of ABA Model Judi-
cial Code and State Variations, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 31, 2016), https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/
2_10.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU63-AFYP].
77. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). The Rules
define a “pending matter” as one that “has commenced. A matter continues to be pending
through any appellate process until final disposition.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT, Terminology (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). An “impending matter” is not one that might
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similar:
A judge should not make public comment on the merits of a matter
pending or impending in any court. . . . The prohibition on public
comment on the merits does not extend to public statements made in
the course of the judge’s official duties, to explanations of court pro-
cedures, or to scholarly presentations made for purposes of legal
education.78
Many situations in which judges have found themselves in ethics trouble
involve comments, digital or otherwise, on pending cases. Some
examples:
• While presiding over a drunken driving trial, a Travis County,
Texas judge posted a comment on a friend’s Facebook wall: “I’ve
had the worst cold but instead of staying home I’m being tortured
by an attorney in a trial.”79
• An Ennis, Texas municipal judge posted on Facebook about the
arrest of former Heisman Trophy winner Johnny Manziel, whose
case would be heard in the judge’s court, saying that Manziel
“was speeding on the 287 bypass yesterday. . . . Time to grow up/
slow down young ‘un.”80
• A Minnesota judge, presiding over a sex trafficking case, posted
on Facebook: “Some things I guess will never change. I just love
doing the stress of jury trials. In a Felony trial now State prose-
cuting a pimp. Cases are always difficult because the women (as
in this case also) will not cooperate. We will see what the 12 citi-
zens in the jury box do.”81
In fact, there are so many cases involving comments on pending litigation
that the Center for Judicial Ethics of the National Center for State Courts
has compiled an eight-page document describing them.82
conceivably be filed someday, but one that is “imminent or expected to occur in the near
future.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Terminology (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
78. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 3A(6) (2014). The comments note
that “[i]f the public comment involves a case from the judge’s own court, the judge should
take particular care so that the comment does not denigrate public confidence in the judici-
ary’s integrity and impartiality.” Id.
79. Ryan Autullo, Austin Lawyers Want More Details About Judge’s Critical Facebook
Post, STATESMAN, http://www.statesman.com/news/crime—law/austin-lawyers-want-more-
details-about-judge-critical-facebook-post/Ir0Qf2ufOhMZjus2Sz0AwL/ [https://perma.cc/
9VG7-YV7Z] (last updated July 11, 2017, 3:01 PM).
80. Chris Huston, Over-Exuberant Judge Posts About Johnny Manziel’s Ticket on
Facebook, CBSSPORTS.COM (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.cbssports.com/college-football/
news/over-exuberant-judge-posts-about-johnny-manziels-ticket-on-facebook/ [Perma link
unavailable].
81. News Release, Minn. Bd. on Judicial Standards, Public Reprimand Issued to Se-
nior Judge Edward W. Bearse (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.bjs.state.mn.us/file/public-disci
pline/1517-news-release-and-reprimand.pdf [https://perma.cc/4F8M-DYWU].
82. NSCS Ctr. for Judicial Ethics, Supplement to “Social Media and Judicial Ethics:
Part I”, 39 JUD. CONDUCT REP. (2017), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/
Center%20for%20Judicial%20Ethics/JCR/PublicCommentsonPendingCasesonSocialMe
dia.ashx [https://perma.cc/L2WJ-JRCC]. See also Cynthia Gray, Commenting on Pending
Cases (Am. Judicature Soc’y 2001), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/
Center%20for%20Judicial%20Ethics/Publications/CommentingonPendingCases.ashx
[https://perma.cc/L9EE-8PCG].
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One case grapples directly with the fine line between helpful public
information and inappropriate evaluative comments on a pending case by
the presiding judge. Texas’s Special Court of Review in In re Slaughter83
reversed sanctions that had been imposed by the State Commission on
Judicial Conduct but nevertheless cautioned the judge about the ethical
pitfalls of public comments. Judge Michelle Slaughter used her Facebook
page to provide information about her court. Some of her postings dealt
with ongoing trials, and ethics charges ensued. One charge against her
challenged the post “We have a big criminal trial starting Monday!” and
another that described an exhibit being assembled in the courtroom (call-
ing it a “box,” when that characterization was hotly contested).84 In a
child pornography case, she commented that those cases are difficult “for
jurors (and the judge and anyone else) to sit through because of the evi-
dence they have to see.”85 The post concluded by thanking the jurors for
their service but was worded as “[b]less the jury for their service and
especially bless the poor child victims.”86 In a third case, she described
the defendant as “very challenging.”87 While the Special Court of Review
absolved Judge Slaughter of code violations,88 it stated: “[W]e find troub-
lesome that these comments go beyond mere factual statements of events
occurring in the courtroom and add the judge’s subjective interpretation
of these events at or near the time of their occurrence.”89 Judges who
would like to use Twitter to keep the public informed about current de-
velopments in pending cases should keep in mind this very fine line.
Taken together, these authorities establish that a judge who would like
to tweet comments on a case pending or impending in any court may do
so, but must take care. Remember first that the rule is only addressed to
comments that “affect the outcome” or “impair the fairness” (ABA/state)
of a matter or to comments “on the merits” (federal). Consider this
tweet, from a state court judge in Kansas, commenting on a Second Cir-
cuit decision about the statute of limitations in an immigration matter.90
Is there any reason to think that it would affect the outcome or impair the
fairness of the federal litigation?
83. In re Slaughter, 480 S.W.3d 842, 855 (Tex. Spec. Ct. Rev. 2015).
84. Id. at 850, 855.
85. Id. at 851.
86. Id. at 847–48.
87. Id. at 848.
88. Note that the Texas version of the pending cases rule merely provides, “A judge
shall abstain from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding which may
come before the judge’s court in a manner which suggests to a reasonable person the
judge’s probable decision on any particular case.” TEX. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Ca-
non 3(B)(10), http://www.law.uh.edu/libraries/ethics/Judicial/judiccanons/canon3.html
[https://perma.cc/6CT8-ZLYV]. Judges in states with a more typical “pending cases” rule
should not count on getting the same result as in Slaughter.
89. Slaughter, 480 S.W.3d at 851.
90. Judge Steve Leben (@Judge_Leben), TWITTER (Aug. 2, 2017, 9:01 AM), https://
twitter.com/Judge_Leben/status/892747282684284928 [https://perma.cc/3AJV-5DB3]. The
Second Circuit case that is the topic of the tweet is Watson v. United States, 865 F.3d 123,
143 (2d Cir. 2017) (Katzmann, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), and Judge Leben’s
tweet links to the opinion itself.
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The greatest danger comes in commenting on cases pending in the
judge’s own court. The safest course is clearly to stick, as far as possible,
to descriptions that do not characterize the thing being described or that
fall into the category of informing the public about court procedures. If a
judge wants to link to news coverage of the event being discussed, and
wants to be extraordinarily beyond reproach, one state ethics committee
has suggested that links be confined to official reports and not to media
coverage that might “contain commentary or reaction favoring one point
of view.”91
What about coming to the defense of oneself or another judge who has
been the subject of a critical tweet? A tweet that discusses the importance
of an independent judiciary or the role of judicial review need not ad-
dress “the merits” of the case or impact its fairness or outcome. A judge
exercising social media self-defense, however, should carefully examine a
federal case suggesting that the mere fact that a judge chooses to speak
with reporters to correct mistakes in a news story may be interpreted as a
lack of impartiality.92 It is safer, perhaps, for one judge to defend another
91. Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 2016-09 (2016), http://www.mass.gov/courts/
case-legal-res/ethics-opinions/judicial-ethics-opinions/cje-2016-09.html [https://perma.cc/
VX4E-6W6T]. But see United States v. Sierra Pac. Indus. Inc., 862 F.3d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir.
2017) (rejecting the argument that a link to news story with inaccurate headline was a
comment on pending litigation or sufficiently prejudicial to create appearance of bias). A
still-developing line of cases about the implication of linking in the context of defamation
may also provide some guidance on this complex issue. See generally Cindy Gierhart, Re-
thinking Hyperlinking: Linking to Source Material Can Help Journalists in Defamation
Lawsuits, 38 NEWS MEDIA & LAW, Spring 2014, at 9, https://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-
law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-spring-2014/rethinking-hyperlinking
[https://perma.cc/ZX32-5YD3].
92. See In re Bos.’s Children First, 244 F.3d 164, 171 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding recusal
required but noting that the three other First Circuit judges consulted in connection with a
motion for rehearing en banc would not have found recusal required); see also White v.
Nat’l Football League, No. 4-92-906, 2008 WL 1827423, at *2-6 (D. Minn. Apr. 22, 2008)
(rejecting argument for disqualification). The lessons to be drawn from these cases are
somewhat limited because the decisions are very fact-specific. See generally RICHARD E.
FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
§16.10 (2d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2016).
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than for the judge under attack to exercise digital self-defense. State
judges (in states that have adopted it) can invoke ABA Model Rule
2.10(E),93 in which the judge is permitted to respond to “allegations in
the media or elsewhere concerning the judge’s conduct in a matter.”94
In light of all this, what about the four exemplar tweets that precede
this section? Some might argue that Judge Smith’s tweet commented im-
properly on a pending case, but I think that would be incorrect. It re-
sponded to President Trump’s “so-called judge” series of tweets, which in
turn responded to pending litigation over the travel ban. But Judge
Smith’s tweet is not about the merits—it is about President Trump’s
tweets about judges.95 Although the article it linked to is largely critical
of President Trump, it, too, focuses on the role of the courts and Presi-
dent Trump’s tweeting rather than the constitutionality of the executive
order. Judge Bennett’s tweet refers to his position on sentencing in crimi-
nal cases, and there are scores of pending prosecutions, but the tweet
could hardly be read as commenting on any particular case. Nor should a
generic comment about the law be so construed. In considering whether
statements about the law indicate improper bias, cases hold that “a
judge’s expression of a viewpoint on a legal issue, in and of itself, is gen-
erally not deemed to provide a legitimate basis for disqualification.”96
And, like it or not, federal judges are bound by the mandatory sentencing
minimums, so Judge Bennett has no choice but to follow the law he dis-
agrees with.97 The state court judges’ tweets are not about pending cases
(the Wall Street Journal opinion piece98 quoted by Judge Dillard does not
cite specific cases), nor would their comments affect the outcome or fair-
ness of a pending case.
2. Ex Parte Communications
Independent judicial research on the internet, including social media,
93. The federal ethics code does not include the explicit provision about a right to
reply.
94. See generally Laurence Pulgram, When Attacks on Judges Go Beyond the Pale,
LITIG., Fall 2016, at 1, 1 (noting judges’ options and suggesting that the organized bar also
needs to defend judges against attacks).
95. Contrast Judge Smith’s post with that of Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Justice
Elsa Alcala Spjut, addressing the travel ban itself: “NO! I do not feel safer now that the
USA has essentially accused ALL people of one religion a dangerous threat. #executive-
orders #muslimban.” She later deleted this tweet. See Judge Elsa Alcala Spjut (@Tex-
asElsa), TWITTER (Jan. 28, 2017, 12:20 PM), https://twitter.com/TexasElsa/status/
825408251198132226 [https://perma.cc/46P8-H9ZX].
96. FLAMM, supra note 92, §10.9, at 278 (footnote omitted).
97. Social media posts showing the public judges in the act of applying laws, even
those with which they disagree, would be a powerful lesson about the rule of law and the
function of judges. See Judge Steve Leben (@Judge_Leben), TWITTER (July 27, 2017, 9:43
AM), https://twitter.com/Judge_Leben/status/890583344827813888 [https://perma.cc/32CP-
FP4F] (“Those of us on here [Twitter] want to explain the judicial role and be reasonably
accessible. . . . [R]ecently #AppellateTwitter folks have rightly noted that judges they
clerked for decide cases on the law, not whim or party. Hopefully others can learn what
you already know about us in part through this social-media exposure.”).
98. Cass R. Sunstein, At Last, a Supreme Court That Does Less, WALL ST. J., June 3,
2016, at C3.
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can clearly run afoul of the prohibition on ex parte communications.99
But what about posting on Twitter? While there are some pitfalls here for
a judge wishing to use Twitter to promote civic understanding of the
courts, problems should be rare. ABA Model Rule 2.9(A) provides that
“[a] judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications,
or consider other communications made to the judge outside the pres-
ence of the parties or their lawyers, concerning a pending or impending
matter.”100 It is important to realize that this rule applies only to pending
and impending matters and not to communications generally. It is de-
signed to assure fairness and transparency in the adjudication of cases.
Facebook, perhaps because it is structured to encourage users to be-
come each other’s “friends,” has spawned a number of problems arising
out of ex parte communications. One of the earliest ethics opinions to
deal with social media involved a judge who exchanged messages on his
Facebook wall about a pending custody dispute. (“[I have] ‘two good par-
ents to choose from.’” “I have a wise Judge.”)101 The judge was repri-
manded for this “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.”102
Twitter, on the other hand, doesn’t have friends. But it does encourage
its users to follow others.103 And it allows anyone to interact with a tweet,
including judges’ tweets, in a way that could be characterized as a com-
munication. This could be done through a retweet, like this one by law-
yers talking about their pet peeves (the smaller one in the box is the
original tweet).104
99. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical Limits on Indepen-
dent Research, 28 REV. LITIGATION 131, 137 (2008).
100. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.9(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). See also
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 3(A)(4) (2014) (“[A] judge should not initi-
ate, permit, or consider ex parte communications or consider other communications con-
cerning a pending or impending matter that are made outside the presence of the parties or
their lawyers.”). Both rules have numerous listed exceptions.
101. Public Reprimand: B. Carlton Terry Jr., Inquiry No. 08-234, at 1–2 (N.C. Jud. Stan-
dards Comm’n Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/coa/jsc/publicrepri-
mands/jsc08-234.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8G6-GHGY].
102. Id. at 4. State judicial ethics commissions have spent numerous hours considering
the implications of Facebook “friendship,” and different states have adopted different ap-
proaches to this digitally-constructed relationship. See generally John G. Browning, Why
Can’t We Be Friends? Judges’ Use of Social Media, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 487 (2014).
103. Unlike friend requests on Facebook, in which access is granted only if the request
is accepted, anyone can follow a Twitter account without the advance permission of the
account’s owner.
104. Jenny Barber Valois (@Inspiredlawyer), TWITTER (July 12, 2017, 11:49 AM),
https://twitter.com/Inspiredlawyer/status/885179378119921664 [https://perma.cc/C7YE-
47E3].
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Or users can interact by writing a reply (as in this exchange on the
arcane but controversial topic of the serial—or “Oxford”—comma). No-
tice that the replies contain the handle of the original tweeter (in this
case, the original tweet by Justice Willett is on top).105
Exchanges like these are calculated to call themselves to the attention
of the author of the original tweet. If the parties to the tweet chain were
involved in a pending case, would the ex parte prohibition come into
play? In one recent Ninth Circuit case, the appellant took the position
that Twitter interactions involving the judge and lawyers for appellee that
took place while the case was pending constituted ex parte communica-
tions.106 As one legal blogger put it,
105. Justice Don Willett (@JusticeWillett), TWITTER (Jan. 12, 2017, 8:47 PM), https://
twitter.com/JusticeWillett/status/819737674798006272 [https://perma.cc/YQ3Y-DCH8].
106. See United States v. Sierra Pac. Indus. Inc., 862 F.3d 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 2017).
276 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
You follow a judge on Twitter. . . . He tweets about life on the bench.
You tweet about cats and the occasional courtroom victory. The
judge even retweets you on occasion. If this tweeting takes place
while you have a case pending before said judge, have you both en-
gaged in ex parte communication . . . ?107
The Ninth Circuit concluded that when tweets are public, available for all
parties to see, and not directed at anyone in particular, they are not ex
parte communications:
[N]one of the challenged tweets were specifically directed from the
U.S. Attorney to the judge, nor have the Defendants alleged that
there were any personally directed tweets. Thus, the public tweets
did not constitute communication from the U.S. Attorney to the
judge. Rather, the relevant tweets from the U.S. Attorney’s account
constituted news items released to the general public, intended for
wide distribution to an anonymous public audience. Under the cir-
cumstances, the social media activity alleged to have occurred in this
case did not constitute prohibited ex parte communication.108
 Nevertheless, there is an additional context in which ex parte communi-
cations issues might arise. Judges on Twitter need to take care that tweets
directed at them by others are not ex parte communications about pend-
ing cases. One would hope that the attorneys in the case know that they
should avoid such communications.109 But on Twitter, contacts could
come from parties or the general public. Just as is true of unsolicited let-
ters and phone calls that a judge may receive about a case, these tweets
should be disregarded but are unlikely to disqualify the judge.110 Judges
should be particularly wary of DMs (direct messages), which are private
rather than public conversations. While Twitter does not allow users to
block all DMs, it is possible to limit them only to people one follows and
to block them from specific users. Should a judge receive an unwanted ex
parte communication “bearing upon the substance of a matter” via Twit-
ter, the judge must disclose the communication to the parties and provide
them with the opportunity to respond, to the extent it would be required
of any other ex parte communication.111
107. Casey C. Sullivan, Is Following a Judge on Twitter Ex Parte Communication?, FIN-
DLAW: STRATEGIST (Nov. 24, 2015, 10:16 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/strategist/2015/11/
is-following-a-judge-on-twitter-ex-parte-communication.html [https://perma.cc/P47H-
AEEU] (discussing “Moonlight Fire” case). For reasons having to do with appearance of
bias, as opposed to ex parte communications, judges would be safer if they do not follow
lawyers or law firms, especially those that have a case pending before the judge.
108. Sierra Pac. Indus. Inc., 862 F.3d at 1175.
109. There are, of course, exceptions. See Samson Habte, Lawyer Disbarred for Social
Media Campaign to ‘Influence and Intimidate’ Judicial Officials, ABA BNA LAW. MAN-
UAL ON PROF. CONDUCT (July 16, 2015), https://www.bna.com/lawyer-disbarred-social-
n17179933600 [https://perma.cc/U4L2-6CPL] (reporting that “[a] lawyer who used social
media and blogs to launch a ‘viral campaign to influence and intimidate’ judges who pre-
sided over a friend’s sensitive child custody dispute was disbarred . . . by a divided Louisi-
ana Supreme Court”).
110. See FLAMM, supra note 92, §14.5.5.
111. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.9(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). (“If a
judge inadvertently receives an unauthorized ex parte communication bearing upon the
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3. Keeping Up Appearances
It is the rules mandating an appearance of judicial propriety that bring
us to the crux of ethical worries about judicial involvement with social
media: a concern that certain kinds of public statements will either reveal
actual bias or give a reasonable person the impression that the judge
might be biased. The rules also tap directly into the tension between the
traditional view of the judiciary as a caste apart and the desire of some
judges (and voters) to allow the expression of opinions about legal and
policy issues.112
Some of the relevant rules deal with judges as candidates for office and
limit campaign speech. Rules also apply to the activities of sitting judges
and prohibit involvement in “political activity” and controversial issues
generally. All ultimately justify the limits based on the need to maintain
the public’s belief in the impartiality and independence of the judicial
branch.113 The limits on speech have limits of their own. Some are subject
to challenge based on the First Amendment since they are content-based
limits on speech.114 All are subject to code provisions encouraging judges
to speak about the law, the legal system, and the administration of
justice.115
This section will begin by discussing prohibitions based on politics, then
discuss the more general limits on addressing controversial issues, and
conclude by exploring whether the First Amendment rights of judges who
wish to speak would constrain the broadest interpretations of the ethics
code limits.
a. State Court Limits on Political Speech
The regulation of judicial campaigns varies widely from state to state,
often in ways that parallel the states’ systems of judicial selection.116 For
example, since Texas elects judges in partisan elections, it has very few
substance of a matter, the judge shall make provision promptly to notify the parties of the
substance of the communication and provide the parties with an opportunity to respond.”);
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 3(A)(4) (2014) (“If a judge receives an unau-
thorized ex parte communication bearing on the substance of a matter, the judge should
promptly notify the parties of the subject matter of the communication and allow the par-
ties an opportunity to respond, if requested.”). For an example of a judge handling this
appropriately in the context of Facebook, see Youkers v. State, 400 S.W.3d 200, 204–05
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. ref’d).
112. As Judge Blue notes, it is expressing opinions rather than having opinions that is
regulated. Blue, supra note 72, at 22 (“Our real choice is between judges who have opin-
ions that have been publicly stated and judges who have opinions that have not been pub-
licly stated.”).
113. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2011).
114. The First Amendment issues will be discussed in Section IV.A.4, infra.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 42–43.
116. See Comparison of ABA Model Judicial Code and State Variations, Rule 4.1, AM.
BAR ASS’N (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
professional_responsibility/4_1.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3RX-F2AW].
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politics-related limits on campaign speech.117 Judicial candidates may in-
dicate support for a political party, attend political events, and express
views on political matters. Nevertheless, even in Texas a judge or judicial
candidate may not
• make pledges or promises of conduct in office regarding pending
or impending cases, specific classes of cases, specific classes of
litigants, or specific propositions of law that would suggest to a
reasonable person that the judge is predisposed to a probable de-
cision in cases within the scope of the pledge;
• knowingly or recklessly misrepresent the identity, qualifications,
present position, or other fact concerning the candidate or an op-
ponent;118 or
• public[ly] comment about a pending or impending proceeding
which may come before the judge’s court in a manner which sug-
gests to a reasonable person the judge’s probable decision on any
particular case.119
Other states (and the ABA Model Code) have vaguer versions of the first
prohibition, often referred to as the “commit” clause. They outlaw
pledges, promises, or commitments that are “inconsistent with the impar-
tial performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office.”120 Their
prohibition on misrepresentation may also be broader (not limited to
other candidates and including “misleading” statements). States that ap-
point judges or hold nonpartisan or retention elections are more likely to
prohibit participation in explicitly partisan politics. Requests that candi-
dates reveal in advance their positions on certain controversial legal is-
sues (such as abortion) in response to advocacy group questionnaires are
often the noninternet locus of controversy here, and current rules do not
prohibit judges and judicial candidates from responding to those
questionnaires.121
In addition to the regulation of campaign speech, some states have
prohibitions on political activity, with enumerated exceptions, and they
interpret political quite broadly, beyond partisan electoral concerns.
While not directly related to social media, ethics committees have prohib-
ited judges from participating in certain activities deemed to be political,
particularly if they relate to issues that would be deemed controversial.
For example, New York’s ethics advisory committee ruled that (1) judges
may not, as individuals, sign a MoveOn.org petition opposing the ap-
117. TEX. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5. Cf. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
118. TEX. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(1)(i)–(ii).
119. TEX. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(10).
120. Commit clauses are often the subject of First Amendment attacks, and some courts
have invalidated particular versions of them on their face or as applied. See CTR. FOR
JUDICIAL ETHICS, Case-law Following Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S.
765 (2002), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Center%20for%20Judicial
%20Ethics/CaselawAfterWhite.ashx [perma.cc/PC7K-66K4] (updated Nov. 2016); MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
121. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011)
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pointment of Stephen Bannon to the National Security Council; (2)
judges may not participate in local grassroots rallies against the Trump
travel ban; and (3) judges should not participate in the March for Science
if it is “a platform for political protest against the perceived preference
among some individuals and groups which ignore or discredit the scien-
tific consensus in favor of what others perceive to be ‘junk’ science.”122
Massachusetts prohibited judges from participating in the national Wo-
men’s March, commenting:
We understand that you wish to participate in the Women’s March to
stand up against misogyny, racism, and other biases and bigotries
that threaten the rule of law. The public and the media are, however,
likely to focus on the timing of the event and the organizers’ an-
nounced desire to “send a message” to the new President on his first
day in office. We believe that a reasonable person would perceive the
Women’s March as a political protest, and the Code therefore pro-
hibits your participation.123
The Connecticut Committee on Judicial Ethics opined that judges may
not take leadership roles in the American Civil Liberties Union or South-
ern Poverty Law Center (but may join and may donate to those organiza-
tions) and may have no affiliation at all with the National Organization
for Women (NOW). It explained the distinction like this:
The Frequently Asked Questions section of NOW’s website states
that it is not affiliated with any political party and that all candidates
for office are eligible for NOW’s endorsement. However, NOW’s
website and its affiliated political action committee . . . appear to be
one-sided in their support of one of the major political parties and its
candidates, and NOW’s president has been outspoken about the re-
sults of the 2016 presidential election.124
 One can imagine that these states would also find judges tweeting sup-
port for any of these organizations, or retweeting their posts, to be
unacceptable.
On the other hand, the Massachusetts committee does allow judges to
participate in “outreach activities, including speaking engagements, in-
tended to assure or reassure the Commonwealth’s residents and visitors
that Massachusetts judges are committed to providing every person a fair
hearing before independent and impartial judges dedicated to upholding
the rule of law” and they may also “respond to comments made by public
officials or others that appear to reflect misconceptions about the role of
122. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 17-38 (2017), http://
www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/17-38.htm [https://perma.cc/3MHP-QW4M].
123. Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. No. 2016-10 (2016), http://www.mass.gov/
courts/case-legal-res/ethics-opinions/judicial-ethics-opinions/cje-2016-10.html [https://
perma.cc/9R98-LP3K].
124. Conn. Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Informal Op. 2016-16 (2016), https://www.jud.ct.gov/
Committees/ethics/sum/2016-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/P23R-86B2]. Given developments
since December of 2016, it might be that the Connecticut committee would now also pro-
hibit any involvement with ACLU and SPLC.
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an independent judiciary or manifest disrespect for the rule of law.”125
The committee cautioned that such activities should “avoid the implica-
tion [that] the judge is influenced by, or appears to be influenced by, par-
tisan or political interests” in doing so.126 An earlier Massachusetts
opinion directly addressing Twitter had, on the one hand, approved of
judges using Twitter for informational and educational purposes but, on
the other, warned against implicitly or explicitly conveying the judge’s
opinion on “political matters.”127
For state court judges, would these rules limit tweets about the court
system, the independence of the judiciary, or the President’s tweets at-
tacking judges? Tweets on those subjects should easily be able to avoid
making commitments that violate the ethics rules or knowingly or reck-
lessly making false statements. Certainly neither of the two exemplar
state-judge tweets would fall within these prohibitions. Tweets such as
those by Justice Willett and Judge Dillard, which could be considered
statements of their judicial philosophies, were allowed even under the old
prohibition on “announcing” a judge’s position on legal issues.128 How-
ever, judges in states whose ethics committees have broadly construed
their prohibitions on political activities may need to tread carefully.
Tweets designed to educate the public about the law, the legal system,
and the administration of justice are proper, but those that could be seen
as supporting or opposing particular politicians or political parties (even
when they are making more general points) may be interpreted as im-
proper political activity.129
b. Federal Court Limits on Political Speech
Federal judges do not run for office, but the Code of Conduct for
United States Judges contains a section regulating the political activity of
federal judges. Canon 5 provides as follows:




127. Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. No. 2016-09 (2016), http://www.mass.gov/
courts/case-legal-res/ethics-opinions/judicial-ethics-opinions/cje-2016-09.html [https://
perma.cc/VX4E-6W6T].
128. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002). As Justice Scalia
noted,
[C]onstruing the clause to allow “general” discussions of case law and judi-
cial philosophy turns out to be of little help in an election campaign. At oral
argument, respondents gave, as an example of this exception, that a candi-
date is free to assert that he is a “strict constructionist.” But that, like most
other philosophical generalities, has little meaningful content for the electo-
rate unless it is exemplified by application to a particular issue of construc-
tion likely to come before a court—for example, whether a particular statute
runs afoul of any provision of the Constitution.
Id. at 773 (internal citation omitted).
129. The opinions about political activity overlap considerably with those urging judges
to avoid activities that might cause the public to question the judiciary’s impartiality or
independence. That broader concern will be addressed in Section IV.A.3.c, infra.
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(A) General Prohibitions. A judge should not: (1) act as a leader or
hold any office in a political organization; (2) make speeches for a
political organization or candidate, or publicly endorse or oppose a
candidate for public office; or (3) solicit funds for, pay an assessment
to, or make a contribution to a political organization or candidate, or
attend or purchase a ticket for a dinner or other event sponsored by
a political organization or candidate. . . .
(C) Other Political Activity. A judge should not engage in any other
political activity. This provision does not prevent a judge from engag-
ing in activities described in Canon 4 [those dealing with the law, the
legal system, and the administration of justice].130
“[P]olitical organization” is defined as “a political party, a group affiliated
with a political party or candidate for public office, or an entity whose
principal purpose is to advocate for or against political candidates or par-
ties in connection with elections for public office.”131 “[P]olitical activity”
is not defined.
The federal Judicial Conference’s Committee on Codes of Conduct
provides advisory opinions to help guide judges in the application of the
ethics rules. It has issued an opinion about the use of social media by
federal judges and their staff members that touches on the politics issue.
While generally it talks about partisan and electoral politics, the opinion
retains the ambiguous reference to political activity in its concerns. The
political activity to be avoided
includes but is not limited to posting materials in support of or en-
dorsing a candidate or issue, “liking” or becoming a “fan” of a politi-
cal candidate or movement, circulating an online invitation for a
partisan political event (regardless of whether the judge/employee
plans to attend him/herself), and posting pictures on a social
networking profile that affiliates the employee or judge with a politi-
cal party or partisan political candidate.132
All of those examples seem to contemplate partisan politics, except for
the vague references to supporting an “issue” or becoming a “fan” of a
“movement.”
An earlier ethics opinion, although it does not deal specifically with
social media, discusses the scope of the permission granted to judges to
participate in extrajudicial activities related to law.133 The opinion views
the scope of that permission fairly narrowly. “[N]ot every activity that
involves the law or the legal system is considered a permissible activity.
Law is, after all, a tool by which many social, charitable and civic organi-
zations seek to advance a variety of policy objectives.”134 Activities are
acceptably legal when they draw on the judge’s judicial experience as a
130. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 5(A), (C) (2014).
131. Id.
132. Comm. on Codes of Conduct Advisory Opinions, Op. 112 at 225, http://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol02b-ch02.pdf [https://perma.cc/KXH4-QEFC].
133. Comm. on Codes of Conduct Advisory Opinions, Op. 93 at 151, http://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol02b-ch02.pdf [https://perma.cc/KXH4-QEFC].
134. Id. at 151–52.
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qualification and when the law or legal system itself, as opposed to some
specific constituency, will be the beneficiary of the activities. Ultimately,
the propriety of the judge’s involvement depends on “how closely related
the substance of the activity is to the core mission of the court of deliver-
ing unbiased, effective justice to all.”135 When it comes to the intersection
of prohibited political activities and permissible activities to improve the
law or legal system, the committee states that “because of the ethical risks
associated with any politically-oriented activity, we construe permissible
Canon 4 activities in this context narrowly, restricted to those activities
that are most directly related to the law and legal process.”136
An earlier controversy, involving a blog rather than Twitter, raised this
issue. When he was running for the Republican nomination for President,
Senator Ted Cruz stated that he would support a constitutional amend-
ment subjecting U.S. Supreme Court Justices to periodic retention elec-
tions, revoking their lifetime tenure. U.S. District Judge Richard Kopf
blogged in response that Cruz was a “right-wing ideologue” whose “ex-
treme proposal” and attack on lifetime tenure made him “demonstrably
unfit to become President.”137 As Professor Orin Kerr noted at the time,
while Judge Kopf was free to comment on the merits of Cruz’s proposal,
this blog post violates Canon 5 by publicly opposing a candidate for pub-
lic office.138 Judge Kopf initially defended his post as expressing his views
on legal subjects, but he ultimately conceded that parts of the post went
too far.139
Judge Kopf’s change of heart came after reading a Second Circuit opin-
ion involving widely reported remarks that Judge Guido Calabresi made
at the annual convention of the American Constitution Society in 2005.
Ruling on charges filed against Judge Calabresi, the Judicial Council of
the Second Circuit rejected an argument that merely speaking at the
“left-leaning” group’s meeting violated Canon 5, citing a judge’s ability to
write and speak about the law, even to groups with an identifiable legal
or political bias.140 However, it also had little trouble concluding that
Judge Calabresi’s unscripted remarks following a panel discussion on the
upcoming election were prohibited political activity.141 Judge Calabresi
was raising the “deeper structural issue” of re-election after an election
135. Id. at 153.
136. Id. at 155.
137. Richard G. Kopf, Senator Ted Cruz Is Not Fit to Be President, HERCULES & UM-
PIRE (July 6, 2015), https://herculesandtheumpire.com/2015/07/06/senator-ted-cruz-is-not-
fit-to-be-president/ [https://perma.cc/Y6JP-27S6].
138. Orin Kerr, Blogging Judge Calls Political Candidate “Unfit” for Office, WASH.
POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/07/07/blogging-judge-calls-political-candidate-unfit-for-office
[perma.cc/NLY9-4QD3].
139. Richard G. Kopf, Professor Orin Kerr Is Correct on Canon 5, and for That I Apol-
ogize, HERCULES & UMPIRE (July 8, 2015), https://herculesandtheumpire.com/2015/07/09/
professor-orin-kerr-is-correct-on-canon-5-and-for-that-i-apologize [perma.cc/38QW-
3M6F].
140. In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 404 F. 3d 688, 693 (2nd Cir. 2005).
141. Id. at 695–96.
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that was arguably illegitimate (referring to Bush v. Gore) and compared
that rise to power to those of Mussolini and Hitler.142 He went on to say
I’m not suggesting for a moment that Bush is Hitler. . . . When some-
body has come in in that way they sometimes have tried not to exer-
cise much power. In this case, like Mussolini, he has exercised
extraordinary power. . . . It seems to me that one of the things that is
at stake is the assertion by the democracy that when that has hap-
pened it is important to put that person out, regardless of policies,
regardless of anything else, as a statement that the democracy reas-
serts its power over somebody who has come in and then has used
the office to . . . build himself up. . . . That’s got nothing to do with
the politics of it. It’s got to do with the structural reassertion of
democracy.143
To the extent these remarks could reasonably be understood as opposing
a political candidate, they violated then-Canon 7(A)(2) (now 5(A)(2)).144
As to the comparisons to Hitler and Mussolini, however, the Council was
unconvinced that a violation had occurred. “Although the comparison re-
marks were inflammatory to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities,
it is not clear that they constituted judicial misconduct.”145 Although the
complainant had alleged that the remarks violated Canon 1’s admonition
to behave so as to maintain the “integrity and independence of the judici-
ary,” the Council noted that it is unclear “when out-of-court remarks that
may be intemperate or disrespectful transcend the merely distasteful or
the inadvisable and amount to misconduct.”146 Claims that Judge Cala-
bresi’s remarks disclosed his general political bias, or that it violated judi-
cial ethics to express disagreement with Bush v. Gore, were dismissed.147
The tweets of Judges Bennett and Smith would be evaluated in light of
precedents like these.148 They do not support or oppose the election of
any candidate. Would the federal standards prohibit the tweets of Judges
Bennett and Smith on mandatory minimum sentencing because that issue
is political? Sentencing and incarceration rates are certainly a much-de-
142. Id. at 691.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 695–96.
145. Id. at 697–98.
146. Id. at 698.
147. Id. at 698–99 (“To the extent that any of the complaints are based on the belief
that a judge must be politically neutral or hold no strong political beliefs, they are without
merit. To the extent that any of the complaints are based on the belief that the Judge’s
alleged bias renders him unable to sit as a judge in a case involving the President or any
particular issue, they are (at least) premature as any such claim would await an actual
instance.”).
148. Cf. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2002-3, 2002 WL 600747 at
*1 (2002), http://www.ohioadvop.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Op-02-003.pdf
[perma.cc/PPF6-CPU9] (judge may comment publicly on “a proposed state constitutional
amendment regarding drug treatment in lieu of incarceration, to explain the proposed
amendment, to compare it to current law, and to describe its potential impact on the con-
stitution, the law, and the operation of the courts”).
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bated issue, but opinions do not split neatly along political party lines.149
Their statements draw on their experience as judges imposing sentences
under the law, and it is certainly arguable that getting sentencing “right”
is a core part of delivering effective, unbiased justice.150 This conclusion
does not turn on the position the judges take; tweets taking the opposite
position, supporting mandatory minimum sentencing, would also be
proper. Judge Bennett has also tweeted about his activities that educate
judges and others about the phenomenon of implicit bias and its impact
on the litigation process.151 That, too, has no clear political party connec-
tion and is intended to improve the operation of the courts.152
Judge Smith’s tweets supporting judicial independence are similarly
grounded in judicial expertise and focused on the health of the legal sys-
tem. Does their timing, or the sources linked to, somehow make them
unacceptably political? Consider the contents and timing of both his
tweets and those of President Trump.
149. See, e.g., German Lopez, Jeff Sessions: Mandatory Minimum Sentences Protected
Us from Violent Crime. Research: Nope, VOX (July 11, 2017, 6:28 PM), https://
www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/7/11/15955570/jeff-sessions-mandatory-minimums-
crime [perma.cc/S7A8-B2HX]; Maurice Chammah, Two Parties, Two Platforms on Crimi-
nal Justice, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 18, 2016, 9:51 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.
org/2016/07/18/two-parties-two-platforms-on-criminal-justice#.T8HJ6Gtrf [perma.cc/U5J8-
C56K].
150. Cf. W. Va. Jud. Investigation Comm’n, Op. 2017-03 (2017), http://
www.courtswv.gov/legal-community/advisory-opinions.htm#Extrajudicial [perma.cc/
XG3H-PPX3] (concluding that judge who “presides over domestic violence cases” may
write master’s thesis “on . . . community response to domestic violence” as long as he does
not “express any opinions on what” he would do “with any specific set of facts or” on any
pending or impending issues); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 2016-135, 2016
WL 7973867 at *1–2 (2016), http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/16-135.htm
[perma.cc/W9KS-4FQS] (judge may “publicly advocate for [a] change[ ] in the Penal Law”
that would create “a new standard in a particular class of criminal cases”).
151. Mark W. Bennett (@MarkWBennett1), TWITTER (Nov. 15, 2016, 5:14 PM), https://
twitter.com/MarkWBennett1/status/798665387349053440 [perma.cc/FLR8-CQKU].
152. Cf. U.S Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Op. 93, supra note 133,
at 152 (approving of membership in “an organization to eliminate gender bias in the judici-
ary”). On the other hand, Judge Bennett’s tweet reacting to President Trump’s claim that
he had been wiretapped by President Obama may cross the line: “Maybe Obama bypassed
DOJ got a device at Radio Shack, wore a wig and snuck into Trump Tower. You heard this
here first.” Mark W. Bennett (@MarkWBennett1), TWITTER (Mar. 20, 2017, 10:51 AM),
https://twitter.com/MarkWBennett1/status/843852568824438785 [https://perma.cc/3BWS-
ZWZQ].
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Trump Tweet153 Smith Tweet154 Smith Link
2/4/17: “The opinion of this so-called judge, 2/4/17: “personal NY Times, “Appeals
which essentially takes law-enforcement away attacks on judges have Court Rejects Request
from our country, is ridiculous and will be no place in a system to Immediately
overturned!” [perma.cc/65CJ-HW9U] based the rule of law” Restore Travel
[perma.cc/M96W- Ban”155
2/4/17: “What is our country coming to when GRN8]
a judge can halt a Homeland Security travel
ban and anyone, even with bad intentions, 2/4/17: Retweets Neal Washington Post, “The
can come into U.S.?” [perma.cc/ETJ9-A8Q4] Katyal, “This really Deadly Serious
smart piece explains Accusation of Being a
2/4/17: “Because the ban was lifted by a why Pres.Trump’s ‘so- ‘So-Called Judge’”156
judge, many very bad and dangerous people called judge’ comment
may be pouring into our country. A terrible was difft from
decision” [perma.cc/SM4Q-MU6X] criticism of decisions.”
[perma.cc/WP3Y-
9SY9]
2/4/17: Links to story Economist, “Donald
in The Economist. Trump Rages Against
[perma.cc/KB9Y- the Judge Who Halted
2VCL] His Travel Ban”157
2/5/17 “Just cannot believe a judge would put 2/5/17 “More on why Washington Post,
our country in such peril. If something respect for the judicial “Constitutional Crisis?
happens blame him and court system. People branch and rule of law What Happens if
pouring in. Bad!” [perma.cc/88DW-ZAAB] matters” [perma.cc/ Trump Decides to
R2LS-85HF] Ignore a Judge’s
Ruling”158
2/6/17 “More on why NY Times, “Trump
respect for courts, the Clashes Early with
judiciary and rule of Courts, Portending
law matters.” Years of Legal
[perma.cc/TCL4- Battles”159
SAPQ]
The contents of Judge Smith’s tweets focus entirely on the problem with
attacks on judges, the role of the judicial branch, and the importance of
the rule of law. On their face, they appear neither inflammatory nor
153. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017 through Feb. 5,
2017), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/.
154. William Smith (@judgewesmith), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017), https://twitter.com/
judgewesmith.
155. Mark Landler, Appeals Court Rejects Request to Immediately Restore Travel Ban,
N. Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/us/politics/visa-ban-trump-
judge-james-robart.html [Perma link unavailable].
156. Will Baude, The Deadly Serious Accusation of Being a “So-Called Judge,” WASH.
POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2017/02/04/the-deadly-serious-accusation-of-being-a-so-called-judge
[perma.cc/X8MT-6LQD].
157. S.M., Trump and the Law: Donald Trump Rages Against the Judge Who Halted His
Travel Ban, ECONOMIST (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.economist.com/blogs/
democracyinamerica/2017/02/trump-and-law [perma.cc/2SUD-DVSA] .
158. Aaron Blake, Constitutional Crisis? What Happens if Trump Decides to Ignore a
Judge’s Ruling, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/
wp/2017/02/05/constitutional-crisis-what-happens-if-trump-decides-to-ignore-a-judge
[perma.cc/NK28-XRVM].
159. Peter Baker, Trump Clashes Early with Courts, Portending Years of Legal Battles,
N. Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/us/politics/donald-trump-
mike-pence-travel-ban-judge.html [Perma link unavailable].
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partisan.160 The articles he links to have the same focus, although they
also discuss the underlying travel ban litigation. The sources of those
articles are mainstream media, albeit ones that President Trump has also
attacked and believes to be biased against him. (In fact, the tweet that
immediately followed “so-called judge” was about the New York Times
and “fake news.”)161 To the extent the articles address the merits of the
travel ban litigation, they are more like the portions of Judge Kopf’s blog
about Senator Cruz’s proposal that dealt with the proposal itself, which
both Judge Kopf and Professor Kerr rightly believe to be outside the
political activities ban.162
If a personal attack on a judge, or repudiation of judicial review, or
critique of nationwide injunctions, came from a nongovernmental source,
a response to it would not be a political act.163 Does the fact that the
attack came from the head of the executive branch of government, at a
time when the country is politically polarized, convert the response into a
political issue and hence make it off limits for judges? Does the
immediacy of the response give the tweets a whiff of political opposition
to President Trump personally?164 If ethics committees take this position,
they will be conflating the legal issue itself with the person raising the
issue, and they will have allowed the President to create a political
controversy in a way that silences opposition by those uniquely qualified
to explain the judicial role that his tweets dismiss.165 That doesn’t mean
160. Judge Smith was appointed to the federal bench by President George W. Bush in
2002.
161. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 7:39 AM), https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/827874208021639168 [perma.cc/2FCP-T7TF].
162. Judges have expressed the same sentiments in a dissenting opinion in an actual
travel ban case, but this is less controversial than tweeting because judicial opinions are a
traditional way for judges to articulate their thoughts. See Fred Barbash, Appeals Court
Judges Rebuke Trump for “Personal Attacks” on Judiciary, “Intimidation”, WASH. POST
(Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/03/16/
appeals-court-judges-rebuke-trump-for-personal-attacks-on-judiciary-intimidation
[perma.cc/NRW6-5BQA] (“The personal attacks on the distinguished district judge and
our colleagues were out of bounds of civic and persuasive discourse—particularly when
they came from the parties.”).
163. Politics aside, whether this tweet would be seen by some ethics committees as
addressing such a controversial issue that it would endanger the public confidence in the
impartiality of the courts will be addressed in the next section.
164. Cf. Conn. Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Informal Op. 2016-16, 2016 WL 8467644 at *5
(2016), https://www.jud.ct.gov/Committees/ethics/sum/2016-16.pdf [perma.cc/E63A-TJL8]
(NOW membership prohibited); Mass. Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 2016-10, 2016
WL7342827 at *1 (2016), http://www.mass.gov/courts/case-legal-res/ethics-opinions/
judicial-ethics-opinions/cje-2016-10.html [perma.cc/62V9-364Q] (Women’s March
participation prohibited). If that is the case, would identical tweets at a different moment
in time be permissible comments on the legal system?
165. Blue, supra note 72, at 33 (“Judges have no monopoly on wisdom, but they
nevertheless have something to say. What they have to say is not the product of innate
wisdom or high constitutional position, at least not necessarily. It is the product of judicial
experience. The experience of listening to the stories and problems of persons representing
the entire spectrum of humanity and resolving those problems (or at least attempting to do
so) in principled ways is not a common experience in our society. When the extrajudicial
speech of judges is limited to anodyne topics of judicial administration, our political
discourse loses the benefit of this experience and perspective.”).
2018] Twitter and the #So-CalledJudge 287
that committees won’t do so because they fear that judicial entanglement
in anything that looks like political wrangling will endanger the public’s
belief that judges are different from other politicians. But they should
think hard before prohibiting a measured defense of judicial
independence in the name of judicial independence.
c. Impartiality, Integrity, Independence
Ethics rulemakers justify the specific prohibitions on political activity
as a way to protect the special role of the judiciary by avoiding the ap-
pearance of bias and lack of independence from partisan political actors.
Even for matters that are removed from partisan politics, some jurisdic-
tions’ interpretations of general ethics rules can limit judicial speech on
social and policy issues based on a belief that disclosing those opinions
might undermine public confidence in the judiciary. New York, for exam-
ple, has a long string of ethics opinions disallowing judicial participation
in matters that are “so controversial that it is incompatible with judicial
office.”166
The governing ethics rules are expressed in general terms.167 Concerns
about impartiality (and the appearance of impartiality) are contained in a
couple of places. The ABA Model Rules and the Code of Conduct for
United States Judges are quite similar:
ABA Rule 1.2: “A judge shall act at all times in a manner that pro-
motes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and imparti-
ality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety.”168
U.S. Code Canon 2(A): “A judge should . . . act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and imparti-
ality of the judiciary.”169
ABA Rule 2.11(A): “A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any
proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances:
166. See, e.g., N.Y. Advisory Comm. On Jud. Ethics, Op. 16-135, 2016 WL 7973867 at
*1 (2016), http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/16-135.htm [https://perma.cc/
3BAB-Q573].
167. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Justice Scalia commented that the sup-
porters of the ethics rules were “rather vague . . . about what they mean by ‘impartiality.’”
536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002).
168. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). In the Termi-
nology section, “impartiality” is defined to mean “absence of bias or prejudice in favor of,
or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind
in considering issues that may come before a judge.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Terminology (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). The term “impropriety” is defined to include “con-
duct that violates the law, court rules, or provisions of this Code, and conduct that under-
mines a judge’s independence, integrity, or impartiality.” Id. “Integrity” means “probity,
fairness, honesty, uprightness, and soundness of character.” Id. And “independence”
means “a judge’s freedom from influence or controls other than those established by law.”
Id.
169. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 2A (2014).
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(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a
party’s lawyer . . . (5) The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate,
has made a public statement, other than in a court proceeding, judi-
cial decision, or opinion, that commits or appears to commit the
judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way in the
proceeding or controversy.”170
U.S. Code Canon 3(C)(1): “A judge shall disqualify himself or her-
self in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasona-
bly be questioned, including but not limited to instances in which . . .
the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.”171
ABA Rule 3.1: “A judge may engage in extrajudicial activities, ex-
cept as prohibited by law or this Code. However, when engaging in
extrajudicial activities, a judge shall not: . . . (B) participate in activi-
ties that will lead to frequent disqualification of the judge; (C) par-
ticipate in activities that would appear to a reasonable person to
undermine the judge’s independence, integrity, or impartiality.”172
U.S. Code Canon 4: “A judge may engage in extrajudicial activities,
including law-related pursuits and civic, charitable, educational, re-
ligious, social, financial, fiduciary, and governmental activities, and
may speak, write, lecture, and teach on both law-related and non-
legal subjects. However, a judge should not participate in extrajudi-
cial activities that . . . reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality,
[or] lead to frequent disqualification . . . .”173
For purposes of a judge considering whether to use Twitter to discuss
the courts and respond to attacks on their independence, the gist of these
rules comes down to whether those tweets would give the public a reason
to believe that the judge is not impartial—the consequence of which
could be disciplinary charges or disqualification. Tweets about what
courts do, the function of judicial review, the need for an independent
judiciary, and even the problem with ad hominem attacks on judges seem
unlikely to demonstrate personal bias or prejudice concerning a party (or,
in state court, a party’s lawyer). Nor do they seem likely to commit a
judge to rule in a particular way in a particular case.
Although the provisions regarding discipline and disqualification are
not identical, cases determining whether or not judicial actions require
disqualification can shed light on the “appearance of impropriety” issue.
This is true for two reasons: First, the test in both cases asks whether the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Second, the ethics
rules limiting judges’ extrajudicial activities require them to avoid activi-
ties that would lead to frequent disqualification. The leading treatise on
170. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
171. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 3(C)(1) (2014). See also 28 U.S.C.
§ 455 (2001) (disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge).
172. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
173. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 4 (2014).
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judicial disqualification addresses whether views about law or policy sub-
ject the judge to recusal. It states:
Generally speaking, judicial bias will not be presumed merely be-
cause a judge has . . . developed views about matters of law or public
policy. This is so even when such views are strongly held by the
judge. . . . Therefore, there exists a strong presumption against dis-
qualifying a judge solely on the basis of her views about public pol-
icy, or even the policy underlying the specific law she is bound to
apply in a particular case. A judge is also not subject to mandatory
disqualification because of her general views about the applicable
law.174
 As Justice Scalia explained in the context of campaign speech rules, “[a]
judge’s lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case
has never been thought a necessary component of equal justice, and with
good reason.”175 Judges are expected to have preconceptions about the
law by the time they reach the points in their careers where they are
qualified for the bench. “And since avoiding judicial preconceptions on
legal issues is neither possible nor desirable, pretending otherwise by at-
tempting to preserve the ‘appearance’ of that type of impartiality can
hardly be a compelling state interest . . . .”176
Expressing views about the law can require disqualification, however,
when the judge’s statements show that the judge’s mind is closed on an
issue and give the impression that the judge has a category-based bias.
For example, a federal magistrate judge spoke at the South Carolina Trial
Lawyers Association Auto Torts Seminar in a way that was consistently
hostile to defense counsel. He said at one point that “[e]very defense law-
yer objects to the net worth coming in [on the issue of punitive damages]
and all of that. Then after that verdict you can get up there and call them
the son-of-a-bitches that they really are.”177 He also described “three
pro-plaintiff judicial decisions” by noting that “the lawyers that represent
these habitual defendants, they met these three decisions with about the
same degree of joy and enthusiasm as the fatted calf did when it found
out the prodigal son was coming home. That indicates that that’s some
pretty good decisions.”178 Under these circumstances, the Fourth Circuit
held that the “remarks . . . reflect[ed] a predisposition against . . . product
liability defendants” that required his recusal.179 It is hard to imagine a
tweet about courts and their functioning creating this kind of appearance
of bias.
174. FLAMM, supra note 92, § 10.7 at 271–72 (footnotes omitted).
175. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 777–78 (2002).
176. Id. at 777.
177. Hathcock v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 53 F.3d 36, 39 (4th Cir. 1995).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 41. See also In re Chan, 2009 WL 4929370 at *2 (N.Y. Comm’n on Jud.
Conduct 2009), http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/C/Chan.Margaret.2009.
11.17.DET.pdf [perma.cc/B66S-C9A7] (citing campaign literature advertising a lecture in
which Chan “will show you how to stick up for your rights, beat your landlord, . . . and win
in court!”).
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Ethics opinions interpreting the rules intended to ensure the appear-
ance of impartiality and independence occasionally reflect a concern that
by merely addressing controversial issues judicial speech can undermine
confidence in the judiciary. These fears are reflected in general discus-
sions of social media. For example, the Utah Ethics Advisory Committee
responded to a question about whether judges could “post comments and
content on legal topics, particularly when such comments may be along-
side a post that would be inappropriate if made by a judge” with this
warning: “[I]f the public might associate the judge with a particular com-
ment in a way that would undermine the judge’s impartiality, such as a
judge specifically taking a position adopting a poster’s comments on a
legally or politically controversial topic, then such a post would be inap-
propriate.”180 The Massachusetts Committee on Judicial Ethics also cau-
tioned against writing on “controversial or contested issues,” although it
did limit that to issues “that may come before the courts.”181 In discussing
a judge’s tweets “intended to reveal the existence of racism and implicit
bias in the courts,” the Committee advised caution, stating that judges
“must avoid posts that individually or as a pattern would lead a reasona-
ble person to conclude [they] have a predisposition or bias that calls . . .
impartiality into question.”182 A federal advisory opinion also warns
against using social media to discuss issues that are “politically sensitive
and currently active,” but the prohibition is limited to issues that might
present themselves to the court.183 Confining the prohibition to issues
that might come before the court may not be much of a limit. As Judge
Posner noted long ago in Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board,
“There is almost no legal or political issue that is unlikely to come before
a judge of an American court, state or federal, of general jurisdiction.”184
What policy underlies this fear of controversy, even for speech that is
unrelated to pending cases and that does not indicate a systematic bias?
(Remember that the concern here is not having a bias; these rules are
about revealing a bias by articulating it.) Perhaps the ethics officials worry
that “[i]f judges are given the freedom of expression enjoyed by other
citizens, some judges will inevitably say things that are controversial, fool-
ish, or even horrifying.”185 If so, it is an overstated worry:
180. Utah Ethics Adv. Comm., Informal Op. 12-01 2012 WL 11916794 at *8 (Aug. 31,
2012) https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/ethadv/ethics_opinions/2012/12-1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3Q7A-84EB].
181. Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 2016-09, supra note 16, at *2.
182. Id. One hopes that the committee did not mean to suggest that the tweeting judge
needed to keep an open mind to racism and bias. Expressions of actual bias, in social
media or otherwise, are of course enormously problematic. See, e.g., In re Judicial Miscon-
duct, 751 F.3d 611 (U.S. Jud. Conf. Comm. on Jud. Conduct and Disability 2014) (com-
plaint against Judge Richard Cebull); CTR. FOR JUD. ETHICS OF THE NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, Cases in Which Judges Were Disciplined for Biased Social Media Posts
(2017), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Center%20for%20Judicial%20Eth-
ics/JCR/BiasedSocialMediaPosts.ashx [perma.cc/D42E-YP4B].
183. Comm. on Codes of Conduct Advisory Opinions, Op. 112, supra note 132, at 223.
184. 997 F.2d 224, 229 (1993).
185. Blue, supra note 72, at 59–60 (footnote omitted).
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But an unspoken concern that the predictably ill-chosen remarks of a
few judges will compromise the integrity and independence of the
judiciary is almost certainly unfounded. The institutions of our dem-
ocratic government have proven, over the years, to be surprisingly
resilient. Experience teaches that constitutional officers in other
branches of government can utter quite horrifying remarks and ef-
fectively disgrace themselves without disgracing their institutions. In
addition, if truth be told, under current law, judges periodically man-
age to say altogether horrifying things while speaking in their judicial
capacities and, just as is the case with their executive and legislative
counterparts, embarrass themselves without damaging their
institutions.186
 Perhaps the fear is that taking public positions on controversial issues
will, like partisan political activity, feed public criticism of controversial
decisions and thereby encourage both citizens and politicians to regard
adherence to judicial decisions as optional. It is important to note,
though, that despite existing prohibitions, many members of the public
already believe that judges’ decisions are influenced by their own beliefs
and political pressure. The annual survey of public perception done for




Judges in (STATE) courts make decisions based on an
objective review of facts and the law 48 48
Judges in (STATE) courts make decisions based more
on their own beliefs and political pressure. 46 47
In addition, “a full 61 percent say that the term ‘political’ describes the
courts in their state, compared to just 34 percent who feel it does not.”188
These beliefs are fed partly by attacks on the courts from the right189 and
the left.190
186. Id.




189. See, e.g., Bruce Shapiro, The Real Danger in Trump’s Attack on Judges, NATION
(Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-real-danger-in-trumps-attacks-on-
judges [perma.cc/KC3T-MF8U] (“Ever since Brown v. Board of Education, no idea has
been more important to the American right than the libel of judicial overreach; no claim a
more effective, resentment-stoking stand-in for racial animus, corporate greed, abusive
law-and-order policies, or retreat from sexual liberation and abortion rights.”).
190. See, e.g., ALL. FOR JUSTICE, THE ROBERTS COURT AND JUDICIAL OVERREACH 4
(2013), https://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/the-roberts-court-and-judicial-
overreach.pdf  [perma.cc/5J3Q-8KCC] (“It has been well-documented that the Roberts
Court consistently pursues an agenda that favors powerful corporate interests and the
wealthy at the expense of everyday Americans. What is less well-known is that in order to
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To some extent, the public’s opinion that some judicial decisions are
affected by the judges’ beliefs is correct and so rules based on a desire to
suppress information about judicial attitudes are rules that protect a fic-
tion. Many judicial decisions are discretionary, and even law and fact de-
cisions on issues such as pleadings and summary judgment turn on the
judge’s assessment of the credibility of inferences, based on the judge’s
own “experience and common sense.”191 In the federal courts, data show
a correlation between the political party of the President who appointed
judges and their rulings.192 A set of hypotheticals administered to federal
judges at a 2015 conference showed their sentencing decisions were influ-
enced more by the traits of the defendant than the law.193 And another
recent study examines the politicization of judicial selection, concluding
that political actors tend to rely on ideology in choosing judges so the
appointment of judges, especially at the highest level, may be even more
politicized than the election of judges.194 It is hard to imagine that they
would bother to do this if they did not expect the judges’ ideology to have
some impact on their decisions.
One can question, then, whether hiding judicial views is needed to
maintain a fictional belief that politics and policy views play no role in
judicial decisions. Given existing public suspicions, a more nuanced ex-
planation of the ways in which judging is (and is not) affected by a judge’s
legal views might serve the reputation of the courts more than a ban on a
discussion of those views. Nevertheless, judges deciding to use Twitter to
share information about the courts must do so with the knowledge that
certain issues might be deemed out of bounds simply because they are
too “controversial.”
Turning back to our four exemplar tweets, do they give any reason to
doubt the tweeter’s integrity, impartiality, or independence—or that of
reach these preferred outcomes, a bloc of five conservative justices has proven strikingly
willing to engage in judicial activism by overreaching and twisting the law.”).
191. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
192. Adam Liptak, “Politicians in Robes”? Not Exactly, But . . . , N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/us/judges-rulings-follow-partisan-lines.html
[Perma link unavailable] (citing LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POS-
NER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL & EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RA-
TIONAL CHOICE (2013)). For studies considering other types of links between judges’
characteristics and judicial decisions, see, for example, Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley,
Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86
WASH. U. L. REV. 1117 (2009); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judg-
ment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705 (2007).
193. See Robert M. Sapolsky, When Justice Isn’t So Blind, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-justice-isnt-so-blind-1502298303 [Perma link unavaila-
ble] (describing study detailed in Holger Spamann & Lars Klo¨hn, Justice Is Less Blind, and
Less Legalistic, Than We Thought: Evidence from an Experiment with Real Judges, 45 J.
LEGAL STUD. 255 (2016)).
194. Adam Bonica & Maya Sen, The Politics of Selecting the Bench from the Bar: The
Legal Profession and Partisan Incentives to Politicize the Judiciary (HKS Faculty Research
Working Paper Series, RWP15-001, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2577378 [perma.cc/
M255-YLKX] (“We show that the higher the court, the more conservative and more po-
larized it becomes, in contrast with the broader population of attorneys, who tend to be
liberal.”).
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courts in general? In a sane world, no. It’s not that they don’t send sig-
nals; but those signals are well within the bounds of accepted judicial
opinion about the law and the courts. Justice Willett is permitted to de-
clare his opposition to “legislating from the bench,” although that phrase
is code for “judicial activism,” which is the topic of fervent policy de-
bate.195 Judge Dillard is permitted to tweet a link to an article arguing
that the U.S. Supreme Court should make decisions on the narrowest
possible grounds available, a position that cuts across political lines but is
also controversial.196 Judges Bennett and Smith are on solid ground
tweeting about federal sentencing laws; both ethics opinions and recusal
cases have allowed judges to express opinions on similar criminal law
issues.197
Judge Smith’s tweet emphasizing the very views in issue—the impor-
tance of respect for the courts, the judicial branch, and the rule of law—
gives no reason to believe that he does not enforce those values in his
court. Not only is his tweet expressing only a general legal principle, it is
one that the courts themselves hold dear.198 Nor should we assume that
Judge Smith will be held responsible for every sentence in every article he
links to, or that certain mainstream media sources are disallowed because
they are per se controversial. As the Ninth Circuit recently noted in
United States v. Sierra Pacific Industries, a judge’s tweeted link to a news
story, even one with an inaccurate headline related to the merits of a
pending case, was not sufficiently prejudicial to create appearance of
bias.199 It comes down to this, then: were Judge Smith’s February 2017
195. Catherine Cook, Legislating from the Bench, HARV. POL. REV. (March 3, 2009),
http://harvardpolitics.com/online/legislating-from-the-bench [perma.cc/K7BL-ME9Y]. Not
“legislating from the bench” is a repeated theme in Justice Willett’s tweets. See the results
of this Twitter search: https://twitter.com/search?l=en&q=%22legislate%20from%20
the%20bench%22%20from%3Ajusticewillett&src=typd&lang=en [perma.cc/HDS6-
9MKD].
196. See, e.g., Tara Smith, Reckless Caution: The Perils of Judicial Minimalism, 5 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 347 (2010) (arguing that Minimalism actually allows judges to apply their
subjective values).
197. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 2016-135, supra note 150, at 2; United
States v. Pitera, 5 F.3d 624, 626–27 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a judge who gave a lecture
to government agents and prosecutors, including advice on how to “increase the prospects
for conviction in narcotics cases,” was not required to recuse herself from narcotics
prosecution).
198. He is also not the only judge who, directly or through a retweet, expressed that
opinion at that time. Texas appellate judge Charles Kreger, a Republican like Smith,
retweeted a tweet on February 4 that quoted Alexander Hamilton: “The complete inde-
pendence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution.” Charles
Kreger (@kregerjudge), retweeting Julie Silverbrook (@JMSilverbrook), TWITTER (Feb. 4,
2017, 10:31 AM), https://twitter.com/JMsilverbrook/status/827917482623119360 [perma.cc/
WR87-JF4E]. (So did Texas Supreme Court Justice Jeff Brown (@judgejeffbrown)). On
February 5, Kreger also tweeted a pretty meme that read, “No free government can survive
that is not based on the supremacy of the law. Where law ends tyranny begins. Law alone
can give us freedom.” Charles Kreger (@kregerjudge), TWITTER (Feb. 5, 2017, 2:38 PM),
https://twitter.com/kregerjudge/status/828342156741967872 [perma.cc/J72U-9XJG].
199. United States v. Sierra Pac. Indus. Inc., 862 F.3d 1157, 1172–75 (9th Cir. 2017).
Since the Twitter issue was not raised in the court below, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the
issues under a plain error standard and it was not taken as proven that the twitter account
in question belonged to the trial judge. Id. Nevertheless, the court noted that even if the
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tweets problematic because the surrounding circumstances make them
too controversial? Unless publicly disagreeing with President Trump is
inherently off limits, even when the tweets relate to the President’s state-
ments rather than his elective status, Judge Smith’s tweets did not violate
the Code. It is not improperly controversial to oppose attacks on individ-
ual judges or to defend judicial review.
Much of what judges would want to express on Twitter about the courts
and the legal system would bother no one, so long as they stay away from
ex parte communications, evaluative comments on their own pending
cases, and positions that portend group biases that might lead to frequent
disqualification. But in this polarized world, complaints can be expected
to arise when a tweet bothers someone, and disciplinary complaints may
well be filed. The next section considers whether free speech values could
or must lead ethics authorities to allow judges to tweet even on contro-
versial topics.200
4. Can They Do That? Ethics Rules and the First Amendment
Most of the ethics rules discussed above place content-based limits on
what judges may say, on Twitter or otherwise. They therefore raise consti-
tutional free speech concerns, although the contours of the law are murky
at best. It is fairly clear, though, that the limits on comments on a judge’s
own pending cases and on ex parte communications would survive a First
Amendment challenge, based both on the interests of the state in the
integrity of the court system and the due process rights of the litigants.
Especially where the ethics limitations on speech are based only on a
vaguely defined desire for propriety, judges’ First Amendment rights will
sometimes prevent states from broadly interpreting and enforcing
prohibitions on judicial speech. The Supreme Court, in Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White,201 struck down an ethics rule (typical of many
states at the time) that “prohibited candidates for judicial office from an-
nouncing their [positions] on disputed legal or political issues.”202 The
candidates’ right to communicate their views to the electorate is a very
protected type of speech, and the majority rejected the state’s argument
that Minnesota’s “announce” rule was narrowly tailored to support a
compelling interest in protecting judicial impartiality and independence.
The Court’s skepticism about issue-based impartiality as a compelling in-
content of linked articles is attributed to the judge tweeting those links, the content of the
three tweets and articles were insufficient to create an appearance of impropriety requiring
recusal. Id.
200. Context matters, too. In the context of disciplinary proceedings, decision makers
may already lean somewhat in the direction of giving judges the benefit of the doubt while
cautioning that everyone needs to be more careful with social media. When drafting gen-
eral advisory opinions or giving prospective advice, on the other hand, ethics committees
are more apt to advise against anything that might be interpreted as political or controver-
sial. In ruling on disqualification motions, as noted above, general statements about the law
that do not disclose a pattern of bias are unlikely to require recusal.
201. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
202. Id. at 765.
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terest is an indication that speech limitations that are grounded only on
the desire that judges appear to have no positions on issues may be vul-
nerable to First Amendment challenges, even outside the election con-
text.203 Courts in general, however, continue to be very protective of their
institutional reputational interests. “The judicial system depends on its
reputation for impartiality; it is public acceptance, rather than the sword
or the purse, that leads decisions to be obeyed and averts vigilantism and
civil strife.”204
Lower court cases following White are mixed, but some strike down
other ethics rules that limit what can be said.205 After White, many juris-
dictions have narrowed their political activity prohibitions in order to
avoid First Amendment challenges. Those narrowly drafted rules prohib-
iting judges from making “pledges or promises” and “committing” to cer-
tain positions that will come before their courts often survive First
Amendment challenges, while broader prohibitions fail.206 Even the ap-
provals come with caveats. For example, the New York Court of Appeals,
while reprimanding a judicial candidate for pro-prosecution campaign
statements, noted that the prohibition cannot be a blanket ban: “[A] judi-
cial candidate may promise future conduct provided such conduct is not
inconsistent with the faithful and impartial performance of judicial duties
. . . [and] most statements identifying a point of view will not implicate
the ‘pledges or promises’ prohibition.”207 Rather, “[t]he rule precludes
only those statements of intention that single out a party or class of liti-
gants for special treatment, be it favorable or unfavorable, or convey that
the candidate will behave in a manner inconsistent with the faithful and
impartial performance of judicial duties if elected.”208
Other types of campaign-related ethics rules have also been challenged
as violating the free speech rights of candidates for judicial office. Rules
prohibiting false campaign statements have been upheld, while those
prohibiting misleading statements have been rejected because they un-
203. Cf. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (invalidating application of
Nevada’s attorney ethics rule governing pretrial publicity absent a likelihood of prejudicing
the proceeding).
204. Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 712 (7th Cir. 2010). See also Wolfson v. Concan-
non, 750 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2014).
205. CTR. FOR JUDICIAL ETHICS, Case-law Following Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/
Center%20for%20Judicial%20Ethics/CaselawAfterWhite.ashx [perma.cc/PC7K-66K4]
(updated Nov. 2016).
206. Id. The current ABA Model Code, Rule 4.1(A)(13), provides that judges shall not
“in connection with cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court,
make pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial perform-
ance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICAL CONDUCT r.
4.1(A)(13) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
207. In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 6–7 (N.Y. 2003).
208. Id. at 7. See also In re McGrath, 2010 WL 597261 at *1–4 (N.Y. Comm’n on Jud.
Conduct Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/M/McGrath.Patrick.2010.
02.05.DET.pdf [perma.cc/D55G-5LNN] (agreed to admonishment for, in addition to other
misconduct, campaign letter that indicated the judge would give special consideration to
pistol permit applicants).
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duly chill speech.209 Rules prohibiting various forms of participation in
partisan politics are also generally upheld,210 although federal circuits
have rejected rules prohibiting judicial candidates from identifying them-
selves as members of a political party.211
The situation of a sitting judge who wants to use Twitter to communi-
cate views on law and policy might constitutionally differ from a judicial
candidate. White and its progeny use strict scrutiny, but outside the elec-
tion context, some courts apply the more forgiving standard of Pickering
v. Board of Education,212 which treats the ethics rule restrictions as a po-
litical activity prohibition on a government employee.213 The resulting
analysis attempts to balance the rights of the employee (in this case, the
judge) to comment on matters of public concern against the interest of
the government, as an employer, in the effectiveness of the public ser-
vices it performs. Seen through this lens, the ‘no political activity’ and ‘no
controversy’ limits restrict “the rights of a limited (albeit high-ranking)
class of government employees and is intended to protect the integrity of
that class.”214 On the other hand, it may be that the judges on courts and
ethics committees will find the distinction between what judges do and
what other government employees do to be sufficiently substantial and
important that Pickering is inapt.215
One pre-White case from the state of Washington said it was applying
strict scrutiny but took a balancing approach (although without citing
Pickering) in the context of a disciplinary proceeding.216 Its results show
209. See, e.g., Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d 681, 694 (6th Cir. 2016); Weaver v. Bonner,
309 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2002).
210. See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1659 (2015) (upholding per-
sonal solicitation clause based on “[s]tate’s interest in preserving public confidence in the
integrity” and impartiality of judiciary, which the majority held was greater than its interest
in preventing the appearance of corruption in legislative and executive branch elections).
211. See, e.g., Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 203–04 (6th Cir. 2010).
212. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See also U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter
Carriers AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (up-
holding the Hatch Act and similar state laws that limit the ability of government employees
to engage in politics).
213. See Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying Pickering in uphold-
ing ethics rule prohibiting partisan activities); Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974 (7th Cir.
2010) (applying Pickering in considering ethics rules limiting statements of party affiliation,
endorsement of partisan candidates, and personal solicitation of campaign funds). For an
argument that a modified Pickering standard should govern, see Lynne H. Rambo, When
Should the First Amendment Protect Judges from Their Unethical Speech, OHIO ST. L.J.
(forthcoming 2018), SSRN paper available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=3027761 [https://perma.cc/33QS-CRRF].
214. Blue, supra note 72, at 11.
215. See, e.g., Wolfson v. Concannon, 750 F.3d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting
Seventh Circuit’s Pickering analysis); Carey, 614 F.3d at 200 (applying strict scrutiny to
party membership and solicitation rules).
216. In re Sanders, 955 P.2d 369, 372 (Wash. 1998) (en banc). The court was highly
influenced by Judge Posner’s analysis in Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, 997 F.2d
224 (7th Cir. 1993). Judge Posner blogs but does not tweet (although there is a parody
account for Judge Posner called @Posner_Thoughts). See Posner Thoughts (@Pos-
ner_Thoughts), TWITTER (Sept. 18, 2017, 2:13 PM) https://twitter.com/Posner_Thoughts
[perma.cc/GU27-DLDA]. Judge Posner retired from the federal bench effective September
2, 2017, and a self-published book explaining his reasons has raised ethics issues of its own.
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that even under a balancing test, a judge’s free speech rights may be lim-
ited only when the appearance of propriety is genuinely threatened. As
the court in In re Sanders noted,
Judges do not forfeit the right to freedom of speech when they as-
sume office. They do agree, however, that the right must be balanced
against the public’s legitimate expectations of judicial impartiality.
But the constitutional concern weighs more heavily in that balance,
requiring clear and convincing evidence of speech or conduct that
casts doubt on a judge’s integrity, independence, or impartiality in
order to justify placing a restriction on that right.217
Here are the underlying facts: on the same day on which he was sworn in
as a Justice of the Washington Supreme Court, Sanders attended a rally
called “March for Life,” sponsored by a coalition of groups opposed to a
woman’s right to choose to have an abortion. His own remarks were
brief:
I want to give all of you my best wishes in this celebration of human
life. Nothing is, nor should be, more fundamental in our legal system
than the preservation and protection of innocent human life. . . . I
owe my election to many of the people who are here today and I’m
here to say thank you very much and good luck. Our mutual pursuit
of justice requires a lifetime of dedication and courage. Keep up the
good work.218
Justice Sanders left immediately after speaking, but other “speakers [at
the event] urged those in attendance to work to” elect an anti-abortion
governor and legislators and for the passage of anti-abortion legisla-
tion.219 The Washington court treated Canon 1’s admonition to act so that
the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved as an
articulation of the state’s interest but refused to apply it as an indepen-
dent basis for disciplinary action. The court also refused to decide the
case merely by defining what counts as political, instead adding a free
speech component to its analysis. While the court found the state’s inter-
est in an impartial judiciary to be compelling, it warned that “[t]o permit
the governmental interest in an impartial judiciary to prevent a judge
from speaking on any issue that has proponents on both sides or that
might come before the bench essentially gags the judge.”220 Under the
specific facts of this challenge to the disciplinary charges, the court con-
See Jonathan H. Adler, Richard Posner’s ‘Bats—- Crazy’ New Book, WASH. POST (The
Volokh Conspiracy) (Sep. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-con
spiracy/wp/2017/09/21/richard-posners-bats-crazy-new-book/?utm_term=.06c6c4124490
[https://perma.cc/UR6D-JG4K].
217. Sanders, 955 P.2d at 370.
218. Id. at 371. White, Sanders, and other recent cases challenging ethics-based limita-
tions on political activities also serve as valuable reminders that the issue of judicial speech
is of interest across the political spectrum. While the current controversy involves
pushback against the tweets of a Republican President, many of the early challenges to
limits on judicial speech came from socially conservative judicial candidates who wanted to
announce their positions on issues like abortion and school prayer to conservative voters.
219. Id. at 371.
220. Id. at 375.
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cluded that Justice Sanders’ remarks did not indicate that he would lack
impartiality or jeopardize public confidence in the judiciary.221
What implications do First Amendment cases have for judges wishing
to use Twitter to discuss legal issues without running afoul of ethics rules
prohibiting political activity of any kind and rules limiting controversial
speech in the interest of maintaining the public’s view of the judiciary as
impartial and politically independent? The free speech cases may mean
that some of the most expansive interpretations of ethics rules limiting
speech go too far. Rather, prohibitions on involvement with political or
controversial issues may only be enforceable when a reasonable observer
would conclude that the judge is supporting a political party, would be
biased against a category of litigants, or would refuse to apply the law.
Statements about legal issues that have policy implications may need to
be permitted or risk running afoul of the judge’s First Amendment rights.
If this is correct, free speech values could well mean that judges need to
be allowed to tweet about the importance of judicial review and the rule
of law, even immediately after the President tweets his criticism.
The problem, however, is that the answer is not clear and so the free
speech argument loses much of its protective power. When the outcome
of a First Amendment defense is a close call, judges may choose to self-
censor. No one wants the embarrassment, publicity, or expense of de-
fending against a charge that she has violated the judicial ethics rules and
so only a judge with a strong motivation to be the one to share the mes-
sage will take the risk.222
For the risk-averse, there is nevertheless quite a bit of tweeting in sup-
port of the judicial branch that would raise no ethical eyebrows, and even
more that is proper and protected despite addressing disputed social is-
sues. Further, there are judges who, aware of the ethics rules but seeing
value in reaching out to lawyers and the public through social media, re-
ally want to use that platform to explain and defend the courts, even in
contexts that are controversial. Is Twitter likely to help them fulfill their
educational and advocacy goals?
B. TWITTER’S INHERENT CHALLENGES
A judge choosing Twitter as a platform begins with the same problem
that all active Twitter users have: getting noticed. One measure of how
much impact a Twitter account has is its number of followers. In terms of
news, major media outlets have enormous followings. For example, the
main New York Times account has 39.7 million followers; CNN has 37.9
million; Fox News has 16.1 million; the Wall Street Journal has 14.9 mil-
lion; MSNBC has 1.89 million; and Breitbart News has 838,000.223 Indi-
221. Id. at 375–77.
222. Blue, supra note 72, at 7, 12.
223. Follower numbers are from the home page of each Twitter account as of October
8, 2017. For politicians who have both official and “personal” Twitter accounts, this reports
the number for the account with the larger number of followers. The New York Times
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vidual reporters have their own accounts. Among those who cover
primarily legal affairs, SCOTUS Blog has 292,000 followers; Above the
Law has 142,000; Jeffrey Toobin has 134,000; NPR’s Nina Totenberg has
81,400; the New York Times’ Adam Liptak has 49,100; and the National
Review’s Andrew McCarthy has 49,100.224
Politicians, of course, work hard to create a large Twitter following.
President Trump’s @realDonaldTrump account has 40.2 million follow-
ers.225 Hillary Clinton has 18.8 million followers; Speaker of the House
Paul Ryan (@SpeakerRyan) has 2.93 million; Senator Kamala Harris
(@KamalaHarris) has 853,000; Senator Ben Sasse’s has 198,000; New
York Governor Andrew Cuomo has 483,000; Texas Governor Greg Ab-
bott (@GregAbbot_TX) has 191,000.226 Certain types of tweet content
can increase impact. Researchers have determined that tweets that com-
bine moral outrage and psychological passion are far more likely to go
viral.227 Some of the most successful tweeting politicians do a masterful
job of using this medium.
Judges, however, have far lower numbers. Consider the four judges
whose tweets have provided hypotheticals for this article. The most suc-
cessful judicial tweeter in the country is Justice Willett (@JusticeWillett),
(@nytimes), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/nytimes [perma.cc/QV5G-CACP];
CNN (@CNN), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/CNN [perma.cc/GF55-NVQ7];
Fox News (@FoxNews), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/foxnews [perma.cc/
H2Y5-B2HF]; Wall Street Journal (@WSJ), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/wsj
[perma.cc/J27E-EAVH]; MSNBC (@MSNBC), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/
msnbc [perma.cc/8DCB-94UF]; Breitbart News (@BreitbartNews), TWITTER (Oct. 8,
2017), https://twitter.com/breitbartnews [perma.cc/GCG8-5ARP].
224. SCOTUSblog (@SCOTUSblog), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/
scotusblog [perma.cc/G9JY-FLYK]; Above the Law (@atlblog), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017),
https://twitter.com/atlblog [perma.cc/PTH7-GETD]; Jeffrey Toobin (@JeffreyToobin),
TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/jeffreytoobin [perma.cc/94BR-QJXC]; Nina
Totenberg (@NinaTotenberg), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/ninatotenberg
[perma.cc/ST6W-GH69]; Adam Liptak (@adamliptak), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017), https://
twitter.com/adamliptak [perma.cc/9A9X-JAVC]; Andrew C. McCarthy (@AndrewCMc-
Carthy), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/andrewcmccarthy [perma.cc/E2JN-
VV8B].
225. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017), https://twit-
ter.com/realDonaldTrump [perma.cc/A58M-RLWP].
226. Hillary Clinton (@HillaryClinton), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/hilla
ryclinton [perma.cc/GCZ9-ZBGL]; Paul Ryan (@SpeakerRyan), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017),
https://twitter.com/speakerryan [perma.cc/SB6S-53FV]; Kamala Harris, (@KamalaHarris),
TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/kamalaharris [perma.cc/9RW4-ZWQD]; Ben
Sasse (@BenSasse), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/bensasse [perma.cc/6FYP-
G73E]; Andrew Cuomo (@NYGovCuomo), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/
NYGovCuomo [perma.cc/M5VH-UPYY]; Greg Abbott (@GregAbbott_TX), TWITTER
(Oct. 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/GregAbbott_TX [perma.cc/J22Y-SN3Y].
227. Jay Van Bavel, Twitter’s Passion Politics, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/07/08/opinion/sunday/twitters-passion-politics.html?emc=eta1[Per
ma link unavailable] (distinguishing nonmoral emotions and nonemotional moral content,
neither of which spreads as well on Twitter as tweets that combine both morality and out-
rage). This piece reports on their study of half a million public tweets. See also William J.
Brady et al., Emotion Shapes the Diffusion of Moralized Content in Social Networks, 114
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7,313 (2017), http://www.pnas.org/content/114/28/7313.abstract
[perma.cc/JY3N-66NM].
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and he has more than 103,000 followers.228 Judge Dillard (@JudgeDil-
lard) has 10,700.229 Judge Smith (@judgewesmith) has 513 followers;
Judge Bennett (@MarkWBennett) has 312.230 Even the lower numbers of
the two federal judges mark them as among the more successful users of
Twitter. Although it is hard to get definitive data (and numbers change
over time), Twitter marketing firm beevolve did a study of thirty-six mil-
lion Twitter users in 2012. It concluded that a majority of Twitter users
have fewer than fifty followers, and that six out of one hundred Twitter
users have no followers at all.231
Counting followers is not the only, or best, measure of Twitter influ-
ence. Some followers are bought and paid for and don’t really interact
with the material posted. (Some, referred to as “bots,” are not even
humans.)232 Conversely, tweets are often viewed by people beyond one’s
followers through chains of connections (and retweets, replies, and likes)
and hashtags (or subject searches) and Twitter’s news feed algorithm.
There are also measures that Twitter users can take to increase their Twit-
ter footprint. Innumerable articles advise things like tweeting often (but
not too often), providing helpful and interesting information, having a
distinctive voice, scheduling tweets at the best times, using popular
hashtags, including images and links, following other people (so they’ll
follow you back), interacting with other Twitter users, using other con-
tacts to find Twitter connections, and promoting the Twitter account.233 A
judge wanting to use Twitter as part of her public outreach can ethically
adopt these methods, and Twitter’s internal analytics can help the judge
see which tweets are having the greatest impact so she can adapt her tech-
228. Justice Don Willett (@JusticeWillett), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/
JusticeWillett [perma.cc/Z554-Q4WC].
229. Chief Judge Dillard (@JudgeDillard), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/
JudgeDillard [perma.cc/P89K-3B8W].
230. William Smith (@judgewesmith), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/
judgewesmith [https://perma.cc/MHJ9-74VL]; Mark W. Bennett (@MarkWBennett1),
TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/markwbennett1 [perma.cc/62C7-TJLS].
231. BEEVOLVE, AN EXHAUSTIVE STUDY OF TWITTER USERS ACROSS THE WORLD
(Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.beevolve.com/twitter-statistics [https://perma.cc/97HA-JVQR].
232. Sarah Kessler, How Twitter Bots Fool You into Thinking They Are Real People,
FAST COMPANY (June 10, 2014), https://www.fastcompany.com/3031500/how-twitter-bots-
fool-you-into-thinking-they-are-real-people [perma.cc/M44D-678X]. Experts disagree
about how many of President Trump’s followers on Twitter are actually bots (and he is
certainly not the only Twitter user with bot followers). For one estimate, see Adam
Edelman, The Billionaire GOP Patron Behind Trump’s Social Media Bot Army, DAILY
NEWS, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/billionaire-gop-patron-behind-trump-so
cial-media-bot-army-article-1.3236933 [Perma link unavailable] (last updated June 10,
2017, 1:14 PM). See also Tim Hwang & Samuel Woolley, The Most Important Lesson from
the Dust-up over Trump’s Fake Twitter Followers, SLATE (June 2, 2017, 11:29AM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/06/the_lesson_of_the_dust_up_over_
trump_s_fake_twitter_followers.html [perma.cc/946L-M2P9].
233. See, e.g., Dorie Clark & Daniel Vahab, How to Dramatically Increase Your Twitter
Following, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2013, 10:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dorieclark/
2013/09/24/how-to-dramatically-increase-your-twitter-following [perma.cc/D7ZE-NXW7];
Sarah Dawley, How to Attract and Engage More Twitter Followers, HOOTSUITE (Nov. 1,
2016), https://blog.hootsuite.com/how-to-get-twitter-followers/#Posting [perma.cc/7DFV-
2PE6].
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nique accordingly.234 In addition, a substantial Twitter account could
strive to be selected for the ABA Web 100, which now includes awards
for social media that would provide a significant boost in visibility among
those in the legal profession.235
Even prolific judicial tweeters may not get much visible reaction to
their tweets. Consider the four exemplars from this article. Justice Wil-
lett’s “legislating from the bench” tweet got two retweets and seven
likes.236 Judge Dillard’s minimalism tweet got three retweets and eight
likes.237 Judge Smith’s combined “rule of law” tweets (excluding his
retweet of Neal Katyal, which has its own reaction counter) got twenty-
three retweets and twenty-two likes.238 In contrast, President Trump’s
February 4 “so-called judge” tweet achieved 33,243 retweets and 157,517
likes.239 Judge Bennett’s tweet about mandatory minimum sentencing got
one reply, six retweets, and nine likes.240 Many more people may have
read the tweets or clicked through to read the stories to which the tweets
link and so these numbers are not a full measure of readership, but with-
out efforts to promote a judge’s Twitter account, it will be difficult to
have a large impact through occasional tweeting.
Getting noticed is only half the battle. Especially when it comes to us-
ing Twitter to communicate positions on disputed issues of legal policy, a
judge using Twitter will encounter challenges posed by the polarization of
the Twitter experience. In its earliest days, Twitter functioned more like
text messaging—a way to exchange personal messages and status updates
234. Tweet Activity Dashboard, TWITTER HELP CTR., (Oct. 8, 2017) https://support.twit-
ter.com/articles/20171990 [perma.cc/VSX9-2YUU].
235. Andy Lefkowitz, Help the ABA Journal Select the Web 100, ABA JOURNAL (July
1, 2017, 12:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/help_the_aba_journal_select_
the_Web_100 [perma.cc/G4L3-DAQE] (soliciting nominations).
236. Justice Don Willett (@JusticeWillett), TWITTER (Sept. 9, 2014, 8:00 PM), https://
twitter.com/JusticeWillett/status/509536749731979264 [perma.cc/VXP6-S5AK]. Some of his
other tweets on this same topic got a stronger reaction. Combined, the tweets that come up
from a Twitter Advanced Search of his account for “legislate from the bench” resulted in
61 Replies, 462 retweets, and 1161 likes. Twitter Advanced Search for account @JusticeWil-
lett and the phrase “legislate from the bench”, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/search-ad
vanced (Enter “@JusticeWillett” into “from these accounts.” Enter the phrase “legislate
from the bench” in “this exact phrase,” then click “search.” This search was done on Sept.
19, 2017, 2:00 PM).
237. Chief Judge Dillard (@JudgeDillard), TWITTER (June 3, 2016, 11:58 AM), https://
twitter.com/JudgeDillard/status/738776858980814849 [perma.cc/ZQV4-9E4L].
238. William Smith (@judgewesmith), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 3:40 PM), https://twit
ter.com/judgewesmith/status/827995215084412929 [perma.cc/Z2RD-M9MK]; William
Smith (@judgewesmith), TWITTER (Feb. 5, 2017, 9:38 AM), https://twitter.com/judgewes
mith/status/828266561148444672 [perma.cc/9MC2-C8TJ]; William Smith (@judgewesmith),
TWITTER (Feb. 6, 2017, 5:30 AM), https://twitter.com/judgewesmith/status/828566600185
954304 [perma.cc/52FV-MG8K].
239. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 7:12 AM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/827867311054974976 (retweet and like count accessed
Oct. 8, 2017) [perma.cc/T9UZ-PCVT].
240. Mark W. Bennett (@MarkWBennett1), TWITTER (May 25, 2017, 1:39 PM), https://
twitter.com/MarkWBennett1/status/867812376325758980 [perma.cc/U66S-KS9L].
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among friends.241 Within a short time, however, it evolved into something
more akin to a news aggregator. The company now sees the function of
the Twitter user’s news feed as “helping users to stay informed with
what’s going on in the world.”242 It is, in other words, a “real-time, per-
sonalized news service.”243
Twitter users consciously customize their experience by deciding who
to follow. Until early 2016, a Twitter user’s news feed displayed the posts
of the followed accounts chronologically, with the most recent at the
top.244 Because the user chose who to follow, there was always some ten-
dency to choose sources that agreed with the user’s general outlook, but
studies showed that viewpoint diversity nevertheless crept in, and the in-
ternet was not the main force driving political polarization.245
The new Twitter “algorithmic timeline” introduced in 2016 (and con-
stantly evolving) may change that. In order to increase engagement, the
algorithm is designed to feed the user more of what she wants to see. The
top of the news feed will not be chronological, but will rank what the user
sees based on variables like a tweet’s overall engagement (how many
people retweet, click, or like it), how recently it was published, how often
that user engages with the tweet’s author, how much time that user
spends reading tweets by that author (even if the user doesn’t click on
it),246 and whether it has the kind of attachment the user tends to engage
with most often.247 In addition to the ranked timeline, the “In Case You
Missed It” feature displays slightly older tweets, again according to the
algorithm’s ranking scores. That may well make Twitter users happy, but
as Slate’s senior technology editor points out, “you can’t see more of
some kinds of tweets without seeing less of others.”248
241. Amanda MacArthur, The Real History of Twitter, in Brief, LIFEWIRE, https://
www.lifewire.com/history-of-twitter-3288854 [perma.cc/TGC3-JTJD] (last updated Apr.
26, 2017).





245. Pablo Barbera´, How Social Media Reduces Mass Political Polarization. Evidence
from Germany, Spain, and the U.S., (Paper Prepared for the Am. Political Sci. Ass’n Con-
ference, 2015), http://pablobarbera.com/static/barbera_polarization_APSA.pdf [perma.cc/
NS3K-MMP5] (arguing that social media use increases incidental exposure to political
messages shared by peers of heterogeneous views); Chris Weller, Facebook and Twitter
Don’t Polarize People’s Political Views, New Study Finds, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 19, 2017,
1:16 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/social-media-political-bubbles-2017-4 [perma.cc/
3H7M-Z2V2] (arguing that the internet is not the primary driver of political polarization);
Sarita Yardi & Danah Boyd, Dynamic Debates: An Analysis of Group Polarization over
Time on Twitter, 30 BULL. SCI., TECH. & SOC’Y 316 (2010) (using response to the murder
of a doctor who performed abortions to measure reactions over time); Matthew Gentzkow
& Jesse M. Shapiro, Ideological Segregation Online and Offline, 126 Q.J. ECONOMICS 1799
(2011).
246. Damon Beres, Yeah, Twitter’s Watching You Even When You’re Not Tweeting,
MASHABLE (March 6, 2017), http://mashable.com/2017/03/06/twitter-algorithms-targeting/
[https://perma.cc/ER96-B75Z].
247. Oremus, supra note 235, at 85.
248. Id.
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It is what users do not see that increases the problem of Twitter polari-
zation and makes it more difficult for Twitter users to reach out to people
who don’t already agree with them.
[A]s Twitter gets better at showing users the tweets that most reso-
nate with them, the risk is that it’s also getting better at reinforcing
their biases and abetting their construction of alternate realities—not
a marketplace of ideas, but a battlefield pocked with foxholes. . . .
The same service that gave Trump’s critics a platform to counter his
rhetoric with facts also gave his supporters the power to drown them
out in a cacophony of abuse and invective.249
The operation of the new algorithm has been particularly helpful to popu-
lar Twitter users like President Trump. “[I]t’s a safe bet that Trump’s
tweets regularly topped his followers’ ranked timelines, ensuring that the
missives reached a much wider audience than they would have under the
old system.”250 Those with something to gain from the political impact of
Twitter have learned how to use the algorithm to their advantage.251
Perhaps the power of numbers could actually increase the impact of a
judge responding to an anti-court tweet. The judges discussed in this arti-
cle did not share their views through replying to someone else’s tweet,
but that could be done if desired. An item in a Twitter user’s news feed, if
clicked on, will display both the tweet itself and replies to the tweet, and
even for those tweets that get thousands of replies, Twitter users who
have clicked on the tweet itself might read at least the first few replies. It
turns out that Twitter also has an algorithm for which replies are dis-
played first, and a competition has developed to try to get replies to the
top. Want a prime spot to get a reply critiquing a tweet noticed? Tweet
that reply instantly and understand how the algorithm works.252 It is pos-
sible, but it seems unlikely that a judge would have the time or would feel
comfortable with that kind of encounter, and such direct interaction
might increase the danger that an ethics committee would find the tweet
comes too close to partisan politics to fall into the safe comments on the
legal system category.
Even if judges can get people to read their tweets, it may be difficult to
influence Twitter users who already hold firm views on an issue. Confir-
mation bias not only influences what Twitter content people interact with,
but also affects whether they are persuaded by efforts to debunk false
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See Alex Hern, Facebook and Twitter Are Being Used to Manipulate Public Opin-
ion — Report, GUARDIAN (June 19, 2017, 1:57 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technol
ogy/2017/jun/19/social-media-proganda-manipulating-public-opinion-bots-accounts-face
book-twitter [perma.cc/8NKR-PHVL] (reporting on studies from Oxford University’s In-
ternet Institute).
252. Adrienne LaFrance, The First Reply to a Trump Tweet is Prime Media Space, AT-
LANTIC (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/12/weird-me
dia-ecosystem/510911 [https://perma.cc/QFP8-BCU9] (noting, for example, prominently-
displayed replies by both human journalists like Nicholas Kristof and Trump-supportive
bots advertising products like a mug to hold “hot liberal tears”).
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information.253 Researchers have found that people continued to believe
untrue statements even when direct replies pointed to reliable sources for
corrected information.254 This mirrors the situation outside of Twitter.
Even for information as comparatively bland as support for an indepen-
dent Supreme Court, people’s reactions were influenced significantly by
their political alignment with what they believed to be the source of a
suggested reform.255 The researchers found that
individuals are less likely to support court-curbing measures when
informed that elites from the opposite party have proposed them
than when such measures are endorsed by either a neutral source or
members of their own party. . . . [And] individuals are more likely to
say the justices should be influenced by demonstrators when the side
they favor is the one doing the demonstrating.256
 More direct interactions with those who hold views different from those
espoused by a judge also come with a higher risk of online abuse, at least
if a judge’s tweet were to hit a nerve.257 Sometimes the judge himself is
not the target of Twitter-reply sniping, and it is relatively mild. For exam-
ple, Justice Willett’s mostly nonpartisan Twitter feed has garnered him a
multipartisan group of followers. On July 13, 2017, he tweeted a photo of
President Reagan and this text: “Only one President since World War II
left office when his term expired & was succeeded by someone of the
same party.”258 Responses ranged from “Named my only son Reagan . . .
nuff said”259 to “Your pick also holds the record for most staff & adminis-
tration officials indicted for crimes committed while serving his adminis-
tration.”260 But there is little or no name-calling among the responses and
no attack on Justice Willett.
Commercial Twitter accounts, which for their own reasons have occa-
sionally taken on President Trump, have been met with a string of replies
that is far less polite. When sneaker manufacturer Reebok tweeted a
253. Alessandro Bessi et al., Social Determinants of Content Selection in the Age of
(Mis)Information, 2014 SOCINFO 259 (2014).
254. Id.
255. See Tom S. Clark & Jonathan P. Kastellec, Source Cues and Public Support for the
Supreme Court, 43 AM. POL. RES. 504 (2015).
256. Id.
257. For general discussions of “trolling” generally and its impact on internet discourse,
see Lee Rainie et al., The Future of Free Speech, Trolls, Anonymity and Fake News Online,
PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/03/29/the-future-of-free-
speech-trolls-anonymity-and-fake-news-online [perma.cc/WG5U-YTKB]; Pam Ramsden,
Internet’s Cloak of Invisibility: How Trolls are Made, CONVERSATION (Feb. 27, 2017, 9:31
AM), https://theconversation.com/internets-cloak-of-invisibility-how-trolls-are-made-73220
[perma.cc/8U4D-2Z7N].
258. Justice Don Willett (@JusticeWillett), TWITTER (July 13, 2017, 8:42 PM), https://
twitter.com/JusticeWillett/status/885675865484427265 [perma.cc/NH4P-29TN].
259. The Conservative Post (@TheConservative), comment to @Justice Willett, TWIT-
TER (Jul. 30, 2017, 8:56 PM), https://twitter.com/TheConservative/status/
885679311809896451 [perma.cc/ZV7Y-BKT4].
260. Todd Wolf (@toddnwolf), comment to @JusticeWillett, TWITTER (Jul. 14, 2017,
8:45 AM), https://twitter.com/toddnwolf/status/885857770901319680 [perma.cc/NY72-
RPX3].
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chart261 satirizing President Trump’s statement to the wife of the Presi-
dent of France, “You’re in good shape,” responders both supported and
attacked Reebok, but no reasoned discussion ensued.262 In my own Twit-
ter feed, a thread started as a legal expert’s technical explanation that
James Comey’s indirect release of his memos was likely not criminal, fol-
lowed by a reply from a female law dean suggesting that Comey would
not have admitted doing so if it did break the law, which in turn was
followed by a tweet from a Trump supporter suggesting that Comey is “as
crooked as Hillary.”263 At that point, another Twitter user responded
with this:
For those who discuss the more controversial issues of the day, Twitter is
not for the faint of heart.264
261. “When Is It Appropriate to Say ‘You’re in Such Good Shape . . . Beautiful,’”
Reebok (@Reebok), TWITTER (July 14, 2017, 3:31 PM), https://twitter.com/Reebok/status/
885959875393712128 [perma.cc/83AF-LQ74] (including prompts such as “Are you in an
elevator with a woman? No” and “Did you just find a forgotten action figure from your
youth, unscathed after decades, in your parents’ basement? Yes.”).
262. Id.
263. See Steve Vladeck (@steve_vladeck), TWITTER (June 8, 2017, 12:51 PM), https://
twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/872873709501112321 [perma.cc/S93L-6CTT]; Jackie
Gardina (@JackieGardina), comment to @steve_vladeck, TWITTER (June 8, 2017, 1:08
PM), https://twitter.com/JackieGardina/status/872878053105442816 [perma.cc/V4WX-
74L8]; Stacy Gardner (@StacySgardner54), comment to @Jackie Gardina, TWITTER (June
8, 2017, 3:11 PM), https://twitter.com/StacySgardner54/status/872908931017920513
[perma.cc/BMU6-4EAR].
264. MsKissMyAss (@ThiCC_BraZiLiaN), TWITTER (June 8, 2017, 3:57 PM), https://
twitter.com/ThiCC_BraZiLiaN/status/872920508974723073 [perma.cc/X2ZM-87G4]. See
also Jenna Johnson, This Is What Happens When Donald Trump Attacks a Private Citizen
on Twitter, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/this-is-
what-happens-when-donald-trump-attacks-a-private-citizen-on-twitter/2016/12/08/a1380
ece-bd62-11e6-91ee-1adddfe36cbe_story.html?nid&utm_term=.829259eab8cb [perma.cc/
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The challenge of developing a following, the existence of Twitter trolls,
and the difficulty of piercing the echo chamber of committed partisans
are not reasons for judges not to use Twitter. Those forces, however, must
inform the techniques a judge would use to get noticed and to try to reach
open-minded users who will attend to useful information if appealingly
presented. They will test the boundaries of the ways in which views and
content can be shared without risking the political activity label. And
they reinforce the Twitter reality that a judge who wants a strong impact
can’t just shoot off the occasional tweet when the mood strikes. It takes a
sustained, prolific effort (such as Justice Willett’s more than 25,000 tweets
since 2009) to be noticed. When weighing the pros and cons of Twitter as
an expressive medium, that’s a reality to be kept in mind.
V. CONCLUSION
What’s a judge to do? Courts as institutions are under attack, and the
three presidential tweets that began this article are not the only battle-
ground. While it has gained far less attention, state court legislation has
also been seeking to limit courts’ power and manipulate judicial selection.
Perhaps most troubling are the bills, introduced in at least seven states in
2017, “that would allow state legislatures to override or refuse to enforce
court decisions.”265 Distrust of judges is at the root of this type of law. As
one Florida legislator explained, he sought legislative override provisions
in order to “curtail the tendency of activist judges to manipulate the law
to suit their political views and agendas.”266
Responding to anti-court rhetoric requires a multi-pronged approach,
beginning with far better civics education in our school systems.267 A fun-
damental understanding of and commitment to separation of powers, and
the courts’ role in supporting the rule of law, would be helpful indeed.
For adults, ongoing efforts to enhance their understanding of the opera-
tion of the courts as well as to respond to specific, unjustified criticisms is
also necessary. Judges have traditionally participated in the former but
abstained from the latter, believing that personally participating in the
G78U-KTEV] (narrating the story of an 18-year-old who questioned Trump at a political
forum in New Hampshire).
265. Alicia Bannon & Nathaniel Sobel, Assault on the Courts: A Legislative Round-up,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 8, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/assaults-
courts-legislative-round [https://perma.cc/Z88L-9MPX] (reporting that “at least 41 bills in
15 states have targeted state courts”).
266. Striking at Balance of Powers, Florida Lawmaker Files Measures to Nullify Court
Decisions, FLAGLERLIVE.COM (Dec. 28, 2016), https://flaglerlive.com/103153/nullification-
gonzalez/ [perma.cc/JNE8-7VSG].
267. See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, We Talk a Lot About Civic Education. Here’s How to Get
Kids Really Engaged in It, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/answer-sheet/wp/2016/11/05/we-talk-a-lot-about-civic-education-heres-how-to-get-
kids-really-engaged-in-it [perma.cc/XY9N-EAKN]. Alternatively, other civics initiatives
focus on at least teaching students facts about the structure of government. CIVICS EDUC.
INITIATIVE, http://civicseducationinitiative.org [perma.cc/KJA4-XMYD] (last visited July
31, 2017).
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disputes does more harm than good. But in today’s fractious world, can
judges really afford to ignore the ongoing assault?
Now that most people get news constantly, and get it online,268 the Law
Day lecture and ninth-grade courthouse visit are like shoveling against
the tide with a teaspoon. As California’s Ethics Advisory Committee
noted, today’s “community exists and increasingly interacts in the realm
of cyberspace.”269 Advocacy by surrogates such as bar associations is
helpful, but for judges who want to do so, communication with the public
through social media can make a valuable contribution to a strategy
aimed at increased appreciation for the legitimacy of court decision-mak-
ing. Twitter is a particularly useful tool for such outreach. For some pur-
poses, groups of judges might even want to coordinate public educational
efforts or judicial response.
Ethics rules are the biggest obstacle to increased judicial use of social
media. In addition to the rules themselves, distrust of a new environment
has led ethics committees to preface much of their advice with dire warn-
ings. Connecticut suggests that it is “fraught with peril,” Idaho recom-
mends “restraint and caution,” and Missouri describes social media use as
a source of “unnecessary danger.”270 As with all judicial speech, there are
important concerns based on the parties’ due process rights—it is im-
proper to disrupt the fairness of pending cases, unfair to engage in ex
parte communications about cases, and wrong to preside over a case
where the judge’s bias against a party or group makes a fair decision ap-
pear unlikely. But it is time to let go of generic fear of electronic media
and embrace the positive potential of new platforms for communication.
Certainly, some judges have done stupid things, particularly on Facebook,
but the same is true of more traditional public speaking. Judges should be
encouraged to engage rather than warned off social media.
Discouraging any tweet that deals with legal topics that are part of the
current debate, just because some might disagree with them, would
greatly impoverish the judiciary’s ability to contribute to civic education
and the improvement of the legal system. To date, much of the discussion
of judges and social media focuses on the behavior of judges who have
misused social media (often in the “what was she thinking?!” category).
268. Jeffrey Gottfried & Elisa Shearer, News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016,
PEW RES. CTR. (May 26, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-so-
cial-media-platforms-2016 [perma.cc/6B68-W8BN] (62% of U.S. adults get news on social
media, and 18% do so often).
269. Cal. Judges’ Ass’n Jud. Ethics Comm., Op. 66 (2010), http://www.caljudges.org/
docs/Ethics%20Opinions/Op%2066%20Final.pdf [perma.cc/8L37-LPZE].
270. Conn. Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Informal Op. 2013-6, 2013 WL 1556755 at *2 (2013),
http://jud.ct.gov/Committees/ethics/sum/2013-06.htm [perma.cc/QM3C-XV3E]; IDAHO
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 3.1 cmt. 5 (IDAHO JUD. COUNCIL 2017), https://isc.idaho.
gov/orders/Idaho_Code_of_Judicial_Conduct_7.1.16.pdf [perma.cc/7FQL-EQB2]; Mo.
Comm’n on Ret., Removal & Discipline, Op. 186 (2015), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/
Files/PDF/Topics/Center%20for%20Judicial%20Ethics/MOAdvisoryOpinionReSocialMe
dia.ashx [perma.cc/KG8C-HFVS].
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Consider instead some examples of what might be proper.271 Some could
be aimed at the general public, seeking to increase their understanding of
the courts. Others could be aimed at members of the legal profession.
Tweets aimed at either audience could go beyond mere description to
celebrate certain facets of the court system, to criticize the system, or to
urge that changes be made. Some tweets would touch on topics that could
be considered controversial but still pose no threat to judicial integrity or
independence, and the fact that a judge has raised the issues may lend
credibility to the discussion, call attention to the perceived problem, and
help spark meaningful conversation both on Twitter and off.
A. DESCRIPTION AND EDUCATION
Tweets like the ones below inform the community about facets of the
court system and even try to interest people in legal careers.272 273 274 275
271. Genuine tweets from actual judges include their handles. Tweets from the
“EthicsCLEDemo” or “EthicsDemo” account are fictional and were created for this
article.
272. Linking to Today I Found Out, Why Do Judges Wear Robes, YOUTUBE (May 12,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gtyvOM4hIck [perma.cc/R6CQ-X5DE].
273. Linking to RadioLab Presents: More Perfect, Kittens Kick the Giggly Blue Robot
All Summer, WNYC (June 30, 2016), http://www.wnyc.org/story/giggly-blue-robot/
[perma.cc/GZM3-ZAFB].
274. Linking to Keith Hughes, Article III for Dummies: The Judiciary Explained, YOU-
TUBE (Oct. 17, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UG0ZaAVF_i4 [perma.cc/
L4CY-GPWT].
275. Linking to the UC Hastings Law School, This is Why We Work for Justice, YOU-
TUBE (June 26, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=18fsuOrgBtE [perma.cc/6V9P-
N39B].
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B. PRAISE FOR THE SYSTEM OR PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
As noted when discussing the example tweets of Judges Bennett and
Smith, judges can comment on mandatory minimum sentencing in crimi-
nal cases or on the effect of implicit bias in the courts. And there are so
many additional options.
Judges could promote bail reform initiatives:276
They could call attention to legal needs of low-income households (and
self-represented litigants):277
276. Brandon Birmingham (@JudgeBirmingham), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 9:46 AM),
https://twitter.com/JudgeBirmingham/status/890221882267521024 [https://perma.cc/J7N3-
ENQV].
277. Justice Bridget Mary McCormack (@BridgetMaryMc) retweeting Legal Services
Corp. (@LSCtweets), TWITTER (July 26, 2017 3:43 PM), https://twitter.com/LSCtweets/sta-
tus/890311722464051205 [perma.cc/CQ59-SQN7].
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Tweets could also provide the tools to help the public evaluate social
media (and mainstream media) coverage of courts and judges:278
278. Linking to Perry Bacon, Jr., When to Trust a Story That Uses Unnamed Sources,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 18, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/when-to-
trust-a-story-that-uses-unnamed-sources/amp/ [perma.cc/T3MV-Z3JK].
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Judges could express concern about discriminatory use of peremptory
strikes:279
279. Linking to Equal Justice Initiative, Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection,
YOUTUBE (June 1, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UFH2IitQzps [perma.cc/
45CM-D26N]. Some ethics committees might be concerned that the #BlackLivesMatter
hashtag included in this tweet would make it too controversial or that the tweet indicates
an antistrike bias that might impact Batson rulings. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Some judges might therefore prefer to link to the Federalist Society video taking on the
same issue. The Federalist Society, Jury Selection & Batson v. Kentucky, YOUTUBE (Nov.
4, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PDKbPQln65g [perma.cc/7HLF-J9YJ]. In ei-
ther case, note that this tweet does not accuse any particular litigant or type of litigant of
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Cf. Matthew Glowicki, Judge Kicked off
Cases over Online Comments, COURIER-JOURNAL, http://www.courier-journal.com/story/
news/local/2015/11/18/prosecutor-wants-judge-off-cases-over-racial-stand/75957606
[perma.cc/7G2P-GNS7] (last updated Nov. 19, 2015, 9:32 AM) (discussed in Browning,
supra note 30, at 137–43).
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The possibilities are almost endless and allow judges to highlight legal
issues that are important to them. While these examples link to content
created by others, judges could also take the time to create (and link to)
longer content outside of Twitter to provide further information.
Twitter is no panacea. As a medium, it has its own problems of data-
driven echo chamber effects, and developing a sufficient following to
make a difference requires consistent effort. But judges have a unique
perspective based on their experience in judging, and as such they can
contribute to the conversation in a way that bar associations cannot. As
demonstrated above, the types of tweets that could enlighten the public
and encourage discussion of reform proposals can be done without
breaching ethics prohibitions. Even direct responses to tweets demeaning
other judges, so long as those responses are about the judicial role rather
than the merits of any underlying litigation, should not be found to be
political activity or to run afoul of the prohibition on discussing contro-
versial disputed issues. So tweet on, judges. While few will be named
“Tweeter Laureate,”280 the power of 280 characters is in your hands.
280. Chris McNary, Meet the State Supreme Court Justice Who’s Also Texas’ “Tweeter
Laureate”, DALL. MORNING NEWS (June 5, 2015), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/local-
politics/2015/06/05/meet-the-state-supreme-court-justice-who-s-also-texas-tweeter-laureate
[perma.cc/EXC2-YGGQ] (Justice Willett compares being the most avid judicial tweeter in
America to being the “tallest Munchkin in Oz”).
